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28 MAY 1987

Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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28 MAY 1987

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## ARMS CONTROL

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: MILITARY PURPOSE FOR U.S. SPACE STATION ADMITTED

### Canadian Role in Question

LD112313 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Igor Charikov Commentary]

[Text] Weinberger, the U.S. secretary of defense, has admitted in public that the U.S. orbital manned space station, the creation of which is being discussed at the moment in the government and in congress, will be used principally for military purposes. In his letter addressed to the secretary of state, read out in the Congress, he claimed that this station was national property and should be used in the interests of national security. At the Moscow Radio microphone is commentator Igor Charikov:

[Charikov] The position unexpectedly expressed by one of the potential participants in the project to set up the station, Canada, served as grounds for such pointed remarks from the head of the U.S. military department. The other day Clark, the secretary of state for external affairs of this country, announced that Canada would review the matter of its involvement in this project if the United States used the station for military purposes. The European allies of the United States have adopted a similar position, in addition to Japan, which at one time expressed a desire to join in the future space program. Evidently the United States has been hiding from them its true intentions with respect to the use of the orbital station. However, the statutes of the European Space Agency, of which ten countries in this continent are a part, rule out the use of outer space for military purposes. Therefore the objections of the U.S. allies are quite logical and legally well-founded. In the letter Secretary of Defense Weinberger unleashed ill-concealed fury upon them. He demanded that the United States should, notwithstanding the backing down of the allies, push through this program, as he put it, "on its own." James Fletcher, head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, came out in the same spirit. He stated in particular, that they must not allow the U.S. allies to dictate how the United States should use its space station, which will cost \$20 billion. Did you take note of that little word: dictate, which Fletcher used? It transpires that both he and Weinberger viewed the objections to the militarization of space as diktat, but it is quite the other way around. It is the United States that is intensely foisting, even to the point of open pressure, participation in the so-called Strategic Defense

Initiative--of which, by the way, the new orbital station may turn out to be a part--on its NATO allies. There is a situation in which the word diktat can be used. In Washington they are patently annoyed at the fact that the United States may come up against the prospect of having to finance the costly project on its own, for the \$3 billion that the members of the European Space Agency and Japan planned to allocate for these purposes is no small sum. But nonetheless, the money is not the main thing that has aroused the discontent of administration officials. By drawing its allies into participating in the setting up of an orbital manned space station Washington was striving, first and foremost, to involve them in a militarist program and bind them hand and foot in order to draw them into implementing future escapades in space.

#### Pentagon 'Charter'

PM201155 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[Andrey Tolkunov "Commentator's Column": "Space Is Not for Wars"]

[Text] A highly curious fact has been made known to the press: The Pentagon has definitely decided to "charter" an orbital space station. Its creation and putting into orbit by NASA are scheduled for the second half of the nineties. But following the recommendation of the U.S. Air Force it is already being planned to use the station as a base for refueling and servicing space weapons systems, in brief for military purposes.

To all appearances militarist circles in Washington plan to view space not through a telescope designed for peaceful research but through the sights of a combat laser. In the current fiscal year alone the Pentagon's budget for the program for the militarization of space will be 17 billion dollars. "Without having fully recovered yet from the Challenger disaster," the magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT has noted in this connection, "the U.S. program may perhaps soon acquire new life, subsidized not by NASA but by the Pentagon."

Yet so far it had been planned to use the space station for the exclusively peaceful study of outer space and other celestial bodies. In addition this program was to have been an international one, in which Japan, Canada, and the European Space Agency intended to take part. Now these partners, fearing, not without justification, that they will be involved in the administration's latest military adventure, are opposing the Pentagon's plans. But in Washington the allies' alarm has caused only annoyance. C. Weinberger, chief of the U.S. military department, has simply called for them to be excluded from the preparation of the project.

Washington's closest allies have thus had one more occasion to convince themselves of the true orientation of the "scientific research" within the framework of the "strategic defense initiative." Even recent champions of SDI in West Europe and Japan are beginning to understand that this U.S. venture is aimed at achieving strategic superiority and that it is not eliminating but merely intensifying the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that it is the peaceful development of space which opens up new prospects in international cooperation. Not the frenzied preparation for "Star Wars," not the acceleration of the creation of combat orbital stations, but star peace, joint research of space for the benefit of all peoples--that is the only correct path into the future. And is that not the aim of the agreement just signed in Moscow between the USSR and the United States on cooperation in research and the use of space for peaceful purposes?

Weinberger Presses Military Use

PM261751 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 87 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "C. Weinberger Cited on Space Station"]

[Text] Washington, 17 Apr -- U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger has spoken out against the participation of the U.S. allies in work to create a U.S. orbital space station if they are unwilling to support Pentagon plans to use it for military purposes.

Because of the high cost of the project in question Washington had intended to enlist the aid of its European allies, together with Japan and Canada. Talks on this issue were scheduled for next week, but the Pentagon has demanded guarantees from the State Department that the participation of other countries in the creation of the orbital station will in no way affect U.S. military programs.

In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, the Pentagon chief said the United States "must not compromise on questions of principle for the sake of reaching such an agreement." "If the price of international cooperation proves too high," the message says, "we must be prepared to carry out this project alone."

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CSO: 5200/1448

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### SOVIET GENERAL DISCUSSES U.S. SDI STRATEGY

OW181115 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2145 GMT 11 Apr 87

[From the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program; two segments, one entitled "Strategic Defense" and the other "Weapons of Coercion," presented by Major General V. C. Belous, chief of the Teaching Department of Dzerzhinskiy Military Engineering Academy, on U.S. SDI strategy]

[Text] ["Strategic Defense"; video shows Belous standing in front of a chart depicting the SDI concept of three layers of defense against Soviet ICBM's; chart carried in NOVOYE VREMYA 1985 Supplement p 9]. In reality Reagan's SDI has little in common with what people in Washington so forcefully speak about. There, they are particularly fond of stressing its defensive nature; it is supposed to create an umbrella to protect it from possible Soviet missile strikes. However, the main goals of this militaristic program proposed by Washington--which is unprecedented in scope--are to attempt to acquire an overwhelming military superiority over our country, to dictate conditions, and should this dictate be rejected, to deliver a decisive nuclear strike and then hide from a retaliatory Soviet missile strike behind an antimissile shield.

I now invite you to take a look at this chart which depicts the ideas and structure of the U.S. missile defense, something those in Washington dream about. Here, a special role is attributed to the first antimissile layer of defense which is charged with the destruction of Soviet missiles during the boost stage in the active section of their trajectory. Why is this done? First of all, because during this period all the warheads are situated on the missiles, as well as are the means to overcome the anti-missile defenses. Moreover, the thrusters create powerful infrared emissions that are readily received by sensors in space; they also serve as the source to aim missiles at. Therefore, chemical lasers, particle beam accelerators or particle beam weapons, or--the height of Pentagon technical thinking--nuclear-pumped lasers are proposed for this layer of defense.

In the second layer of defense, means of mechanical destruction of targets are proposed, such as electromagnetic rail guns and satellites equipped with self-guided missiles with reduced-size warheads.

The following is sometimes asked: Why can't the same type of laser and particle beam weapons used in the first layer of defense be utilized in the second

layer? The reason for this should be sought in the following: First, the Americans are researching ways to destroy Soviet missiles on a broad front. Therefore, not relying entirely on their ability to create a laser weapons in the near future, they are also paying attention to such weapons as electromagnetic rail guns and satellites equipped with self-guided missiles with reduced-size warheads. Moreover, they feel that to ensure defenses against any one form of destructive force--for example a laser force--is considerably easier than to create a combined defense which would act against all types of possible destructive forces. That is why if in the first instance, the destructive force is based on a thermal strike, then the weapons used here are those which cause heavy mechanical destruction.

Finally, in the third layer of defense, which will be positioned on U.S. territory, long-range intercept missiles with an action radius of up to 600-800 km and short-range intercept missiles with an action radius of 9-15 km will be deployed.

The height of American military technology is the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser. [Video cuts to second segment "Weapons of Coercion"; video shows Belous standing in front of a new chart depicting SDI components]

In the opinion of various military and political observers, President Reagan's SDI announcement to a great extent influenced the conviction of Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, that the X-ray laser will become the most effective weapon in future antimissile defenses. From then on Washington simply would not imagine the creation of a promising antimissile defense system without the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser.

What exactly is this device, the combination of laser and bomb? In the American magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, an American military specialist described the fundamental design of this weapon as follows: Imagine a nuclear warhead with a powerful nuclear charge inside. It also has a target homing device aided by a high/speed computer, the speed of which must reach billions of operations per second. On the surface of the warhead there are up to 50 laser rods several meters in length. Inside each there is a thin wire of an active substance which will emit X-rays. Each rod can, like the barrel of a gun, be aimed at any point in space.

Work on X-ray lasers is far from complete. According to leading scientists, it is a long way off. Thus, in the opinion of Professor (Reiner) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, work on the exotic weapons system is at such a level that the distance which separates present prototypes of the exotic weapon from military models is approximately the same as that between a kite and a Boeing-747.

Despite all this, Pentagon generals are already working out military tactics using this new strike weapon. A group of scientists in the United States headed by Nobel laureate Professor Hans Bethe, participant in the Manhattan project which created the atomic bomb, described the possible use of this weapon in a scientific journal. It calls for X-ray laser warheads to be placed on missiles abroad nuclear submarines. In case of a crisis situation, the submarines would be secretly placed in patrol areas and take up battle

positions as close as possible near areas where Soviet missile forces are stationed. With this in mind the following areas have been selected: the northern part of the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Norwegian Sea. Upon receiving a signal from the missile attack warning system, a command is given to launch the missiles. They are launched vertically, and once they have achieved the necessary height they will launch the warheads on a direct-sight range. As soon as the warheads are placed on this range and reach the correct height, the targeting system aided by a fast computer begins to aim all the laser rods onto their targets. The fast computer gives the order to activate the explosive system. The nuclear charge is exploded, and initially, energy in the form of X-rays is produced. These X-rays are distributed at the speed of light and must convert the active substance of the rods into a plasma state. Then, the electrons returning to their shells [obolochka] emit the excess energy in the X-ray spectrum. This short impulse, which lasts a millionth of a second, must be very powerful and must distribute itself along the axis of a rod and in the direction of hostile missiles; it must reach them instantaneously and destroy them. [Video cuts to show clips of an FRG film made by (Monica Maure) showing battle scenes involving space stations, satellites, and missiles.]

The Soviet Union obviously cannot remain indifferent to these aggressive military preparations by Washington. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of our party, has pointed out on many occasions: There will be an answer on our part. Our answer will be worthy of our great Soviet people. It will not be an answer that Washington expects, but it will be an answer that will render the SDI program completely worthless.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR DOES NOT HAVE OWN SDI BUT CAN COUNTER WASHINGTON'S

PM161015 Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Apr 87 p 3

["Military Observer's Notes" by Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel V. Morozov: "'Star Wars' or 'Star Peace'. On the Question of USSR Counter-measures to the U.S. SDI"--first two paragraphs are a reader's letter]

[Excerpts] Can it be said that the arms race in space has already started, and how is the Soviet Union responding to the U.S. SDI program?

Yu. Nikulichev (Novosibirsk)

At present neither the USSR nor the United States has weapons in space. But in order to establish the false thesis about the USSR having "its own SDI," the U.S. mass news media claim that the militarization of outer space started a long time ago, almost simultaneously with the appearance of satellites for various military purposes.

It is, however, perfectly obvious that the communications and navigation satellites, missile attack warning satellites, and other objects in space now in use by both sides are not weapons in the proper sense of the word: They pose no threat of direct attack in or from outer space, they do not "shoot," and they cannot kill. Moreover, the aforementioned satellite systems help to maintain strategic stability, in particular by denying the opposite side an opportunity to deliver a surprise disabling nuclear strike.

Thus, let us emphasize again, there is no "Soviet SDI" at all in existence--this is a downright fabrication by Washington propagandists. They need it to cover up the aggressive essence of the "Star Wars" program and to justify the continuing nuclear tests in Nevada.

As for the claims, still circulating in the West, about the USSR's "technological weakness" and its "inability" to give an appropriate response to the plans for the deployment of strike space weapons, the most dangerous variety of modern offensive weapons, we can say the following.

The Soviet Union's political response to the U.S. SDI is unambiguous: It counters the "Star Wars" program with a "Star Peace" program, a program for broad international cooperation.

At the same time, the USSR has never made, and does not make any secret of the fact that it conducts appropriate research work in the field of outer space, including the military plane. Let us note, however, that this work is in no way all aimed at the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons and involves only the improvement of space-based early warning, intelligence gathering, communications, and navigation systems. The Soviet Union firmly adheres to the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty of unlimited duration, and calls on the United States to strengthen this treaty's regime and strictly perform its provisions.

But what if the United States, in violation of the ABM Treaty, nevertheless takes the risk of deploying strike space weapons to ensure the delivery of a nuclear first strike against the USSR and its allies? The forced response by the Soviet Union will be commensurate with the threat posed by the deployment of the U.S. SDI system.

It must also be borne in mind that the USSR's material and intellectual potential today is capable of ensuring the possibility of creating [sozdaniye] any counterweapon. M. S. Gorbachev has said: "...We will find a convincing response, and by no means necessarily in space. We are well aware of the potential of modern science, of our potential. There is nothing that the United States can do that we cannot do,... But we are against such a choice, we are against the absurd U.S. logic of arms. For us, a ban on space strike weapons is not a problem involving a fear of falling behind, but a problem of responsibility,... We cannot be exhausted by the arms race, we cannot be taken from space, we cannot be overtaken technologically. Nothing good will come out of these attempts."

In making such vain attempts, the United States is frankly calculating that the Soviet Union, with a view to maintaining equilibrium, will also start to create [sozdavat] its own SDI, along similar lines to the U.S. one, thus finding itself involved in what would be for it a debilitating arms race in space, and will undermine its economy. Let us say it bluntly: Such calculations are totally unfounded and are based on a shortsighted underestimation of the Soviet Union's strength and potential. As for the military aspect of the problem, it must be said that, should it become necessary, any Soviet counterweapon would be, first, capable of substantially invalidating the complex U.S. ABM defense system with space based elements. It will not be the USSR's ICBM's that will turn into "useless scrap," as the creators of SDI dream, but these expensive elements of the U.S. space based ABM defense.

Second, these weapons would be capable of perforating Washington's "space shield" and effecting a strike in retribution for a nuclear attack that would be unacceptable to the aggressor.

In this context, no illusions should be nurtured by those people in the West who still count on the USSR's "technological weakness."

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### PRAVDA DISPUTES EDWARD TELLER CASE FOR SDI

PM211307 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 April 1987 Second Edition carries on page 5 a 1,000-word "slightly abbreviated" reprint, entitled "Shield Rather Than Sword," of a NEW YORK TIMES magazine article by U.S. physicist Edward Teller in which he promotes SDI as the alternative to the "balance of terror." Alongside the Teller reprint, under the same rubric, "Different Viewpoints," is the following reply by PRAVDA political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, entitled "If There Is No Sword, You Will Not Need a Shield":

"Edward Teller is famous as the creator of the U.S. hydrogen bomb and as one of the initiators of the 'Star Wars' program. In this article he attempts to call into question the value of the ABM Treaty and its political and philosophical significance: Ensuring stability because of the absence of ABM defenses and thus halting the age-old confrontation, highly dangerous in the nuclear era, between 'shield' and 'sword.'"

"Teller calls this concept erroneous and claims that the USSR is 'using every method there is, including treaties,' to preserve its exclusive 'monopoly in defense.' In an effort to confirm this using examples, the writer either cites Soviet actions permitted by the treaty (the ABM system around the capital) or pretends that air defense facilities (the SAM-12 missile) are ABM facilities, or presents hypotheses as facts. Contrary to what he says, the USSR is not creating an extensive ABM defense system and is not engaged in developing space strike weapons, as is the United States. If there really are grounds for such claims, why will the U.S. side not accept the Soviet proposal: A mutual ban on all work on creating space strike weapons and the opening of laboratories for verification?

"Teller does not believe in a nuclear-free world. Can treaties be 100-percent reliable? Can disarmament through talks prevent a war?--he asks doubtfully. If one approaches the matter seriously and honestly, if one really thinks about mankind's future, the only appropriate reply is in the affirmative. But such a reply requires a willingness to abandon nuclear weapons. And this is precisely what the 'father of the hydrogen bomb' wants to avoid.

"In Teller's view, the actual strengthening of reliability depends on lessening the effectiveness of mass destruction weapons, to which category he rightly ascribes toxic warfare agents as well as nuclear missiles. But can one seriously believe that respirators or any other protective devices will save

the human anthills, which modern cities have become, in the event of a world war involving the mass use of chemical and biological weapons? It is a difficult to picture this possibility as it is to imagine a 100-percent impenetrable ARM shield. (I mean, if only one percent of the warheads was to get through, the major cities of the countries involved in the conflict would be turned into radioactive dust, not to mention the ensuing global ecological catastrophe.)

Talks, Teller claims, cannot guarantee the elimination of all nuclear armaments. But if SDI were the theme of the talks the road leading from 'terror without balance' to 'balance without terror' would allegedly be open.

"These arguments of Teller's do not hang together. Why is it possible to agree on transferring military rivalry to space, but not on eliminating nuclear weapons? Isn't it simpler to remove the source of the threat--mass destruction weapons--than spend vast sums of money in the hope of ruling out the possibility of their use?

"In my view, there is one element in Teller's arguments that perhaps merits expert study. To all appearances, the writer is aware of the increasing risk of an unpremeditated nuclear conflict and he is in favor of an international agreement whose participants would inform one another of any important missile launches at least 6 hours in advance. He is prepared to accept that it would be a useful step toward expanding confidence-building measures in the military sphere.

"In his article Teller touches on the question of Washington's reaction to the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949. At first, he says, the United States wanted to create air defense facilities, but it subsequently abandoned its efforts and concentrated on the threat of a retaliatory strike. I will remind you what actually happened.

"What are we to do now?"--this was President Truman's reaction to the news that the Soviet Union had taken only 4 years to deprive the United States of its monopoly on nuclear weapons.

"It was then that Teller decided his moment had come. He was still working on the creation of the American atom bomb when he put forward the idea of using it as the detonator of an incomparably more powerful, thermonuclear explosion. In 1949 the physicist suggested to the president accelerated work on a hydrogen bomb in order to retrieve the U.S. military superiority and the ability to blackmail the USSR.

"To that end Washington latched on to one scientific and technical innovation after another in the hope of using it as the key to military superiority. Having lost its atom bomb monopoly the United States took up the hydrogen bomb. Then it placed the emphasis on missile-carrying submarines. Then on multiple warheads. Now it is ranting about the militarization of space. What for? U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger is pretty frank about this: 'If we manage to create a system which will make Soviet armaments ineffective, we will be able to return to the situation where the United States was the only country in possession of nuclear weapons.' This is Teller's dream too when

he talks now about 'shield' and 'sword,' as in 1949, when he was advocating a 'superbomb.'

"Teller admits that there is no miraculous antidote to the nuclear threat. If so, it is futile to search for the magic 'shield.' The only way is to destroy the nuclear 'sword,' that is, eliminate the actual source of the threat."

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CSO: 5200/1443

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### TASS CITES U.S. PHYSICISTS' OPPOSITION TO SDI

LD242154 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT 24 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 24 TASS -- The biggest physicists organisation in the USA, the American Physical Society, submitted to the Congress its report evaluating the state of work in the framework of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" which envisages the creation of strike space arms.

The authors of the document consider just one specific question of how real as a whole is the project of creating SDI. The project which, as President Ronald Reagan asserted, will make nuclear weapons "obsolete and important". The physicists are of the opinion that decades will pass before it will become clear if that design is real. The authors of the report also point out that at least till 1997 it will be impossible to answer the question if the creation of laser and ray anti-missile weapons is in principle feasible.

Though the document views only the scientific and technological aspects of SDI without taking into consideration the impact of the "Star Wars" programme of international security and arms control its authors deemed it necessary to warn that the use of an ABM system will space-basing elements will entail a large-scale radioactive contamination of the United States territory if nuclear strikes are exchanged.

One of the authors of the report, Professor Ruth House, declared that SDI cannot end the public's concern about nuclear menace. The document also refutes assertions of Washington representatives about the "non-nuclear nature" of SDI. American physicists emphasize that the creation of arms systems in SDI framework will entail orbiting nuclear reactors on platforms in near-earth space.

The conclusion of the American scientists has dealt the strongest blow at SDI in all the period it exists, this is how the NBC television network commented on the report's publishing. The ASSOCIATED PRESS stated that report submitted by the physicists sharply contradicts the viewpoint expressed by U.S. Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger and other representatives of the administration. They insist on early decision to deploy arms systems under the "Star Wars" programme in the early nineties.

At the same time, as the ABC television company warns in this connection, SDI is more than a programme. It is an ideology with Washington, and the Pentagon intends to insist on SDI even if it will have less and less supporters.

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CSO: 5200/1448

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### TASS ON U.S. DEBATE OVER ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION

#### State Department Report

LD010818 Moscow TASS in English 0756 GMT 1 May 87

[Text] Washington May 1 TASS -- The United States is constructing a pretext for unilaterally revising the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty of 1972.

The State Department yesterday announced that it had completed a report on the document's negotiating history and ratification record and sent it out "for comments" by other agencies.

Reagan administration officials told THE WASHINGTON POST the report "concludes" that the "broad," or permissive, interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which is needed by Washington to prove the legality of its "Star Wars" project and space weapon tests, was justified.

The untenability of the administration's position on the issue, however, was recently demonstrated by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn who recently provided congress with incontrovertible evidence that the treaty's spirit and letter are only met by its traditional interpretation.

#### Opposition 'Muzzled'

LD301105 Moscow TASS in English 0919 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 30 TASS -- The U.S. Administration has muzzled key witnesses who were to give evidence in Congress on the plans of the White House to unilaterally change the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This has been stated Wednesday by Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat from Rhode Island, at joint hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

Thomas Graham, general counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jack McNeil, assistant general counsel in the Defense Department, were summoned to give evidence. However, they did not turn up. Senator Pell said that the administration had obviously made a last-moment decision on a high level to prevent both witnesses from giving evidence.

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CSO: 5200/1448

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### USSR: COMMENTS ON JAPANESE SDI PARTICIPATION

#### To Participate Despite Tariffs

OW220039 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1115 GMT 21 Apr 87

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Igor Fesuneneko]

[Text] In connection with the U.S. decision to implement a 100 percent tariff on some Japanese imports, a new blow could be delivered to Japan in the near future, this time from the United Kingdom. The Margaret Thatcher government will be looking at the question of introducing trade sanctions against Japan later this week, reports the DAILY TELEGRAPH today.

According to the newspaper, the so-called London problem will be discussed on Thursday during the U.K. Cabinet meeting, which will be addressed by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The object of the planned sanctions is to force Japan to open its markets wider to British goods, and to create a more conducive climate for the activities of British firms in that country.

This new anti-Japanese demarche -- this blow from the UK -- is being prepared within the framework of a massive and, by all accounts, coordinated attack by Western countries on their Far East partner.

Continuing with this coarse line of pressuring Tokyo, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, demanded from Japan an introduction of limitations on trade with the Soviet Union. So it has come to this.

At a meeting today in Washington with Shintaro Abe, chairman of the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] Executive Council, who had arrived in Washington as a special envoy for the Prime Minister, the Pentagon chief expressed grave concern with the export of Japanese machinery to the USSR. Weinberger even stooped to such a level as to maintain that such trade operations threaten the interests of U.S. security. At the same time, he announced that, in the U.S. Congress and the Administration, the attitude to Japan is becoming more severe.

What amazes me is this: Despite all these moves, insulting threats, and coarse pressure, the Japanese, strange as it may seem, are continuing to fulfill all Washington's demands in relations to join in the SDI program.

As recently as this morning, news was heard in Tokyo that agreement on this could be signed as early as the end of this month, during the visit of Prime Minister Yasuhiro

Nakasone to Washington. This was reported this morning by KYODO, citing well-informed sources.

Makoto Watanabe, the special representative of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is now in Washington, told a KYODO journalist that there are no longer important differences between Tokyo and Washington on conditions for Japanese participation in the SDI. As was reported earlier, Washington shows great interest in Japanese research in laser and computer technology, which can be used in the manufacture of space arms.

#### Japan Postpones Agreement

LD241508 Moscow TASS in English 1414 GMT 24 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo April 24 TASS -- The Japanese Government decided today to postpone the concluding of an official agreement with the U.S. on terms of Japan's participation in Reagan's "Star Wars" program.

According to the Japanese press, Prime Minister Nakasone planned to sign the agreement during his official visit to Washington scheduled for the end of April with a view to reducing the intensity of the Japanese-American trade war.

The postponement was brought about by the need to additionally coordinate concrete details of the agreement which is being worked out, KYODO TSUSHIN reports. Nakasone's statement last September to the effect that Tokyo was joining the implementation of the "Star Wars" program triggered protests of opposition parties and the scientific circles of the country.

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CSO: 5200/1448

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### SOVIET RESEARCHERS DEVELOP MORE POWERFUL LASERS

LD231842 Moscow TASS in English 0851 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS -- Soviet experts have developed lasers with a power output twice that of the known foreign analogs that need the same amount of energy to make them work.

The new lasers have been developed by a group of experts at the Institute of General Physics under the USSR Academy of Sciences. Higher power outputs have been made possible by the use of a new variety of garnet crystals as one of the main laser components. A TASS correspondent was told by the researchers that one of the main obstacles holding back wide-scale use of lasers is their low efficiency. The power output of a laser is still much lower than the amount of energy needed to generate a laser beam.

Laser technology is to travel a long road in its development and the latest achievement of Soviet physicists is a step forward along it.

"The efficiency of the new devices is 7 per cent when light is emitted in a steady beam, and 3.5 per cent when light is emitted in pulses," Professor Ivan Shcherbakov, head of a research division at the institute of general physics, told the TASS correspondent. "The foreign analogs we know of have an efficiency of 2 to 5 and 1 per cent respectively. The new lasers can operate with a high frequency of pulse repetition. They open up new opportunities in the machining of various materials and can be applied in scientific research," Professor Shcherbakov said.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### BEIJING REVIEW DOUBTS EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF SDI

OW281040 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English 20 Apr 87 pp 10, 11

["International" article by Zhuang Qubing: "SDI Early Deployment Doubted"]

[Text] At the beginning of this year, U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger announced that the United States might begin deploying the first phase of the "Star Wars" programme, officially known as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), sometime in 1993 to 1994. To clear the way for extensive testing and early deployment of SDI, the Reagan administration is trying to make a broad interpretation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which bans "developments, testing and deployment" of any space-based missile defense system.

The White House is concentrating on a looser interpretation of the treaty and trying to make some of its definitions more flexible because of intense pressure from Congress not to violate the ABM treaty, which is the last major surviving arms control agreement between the superpowers. Some Pentagon officials maintain that there are no obstacles to deploying the first phase of SDI because the treaty's provisions on space testing are unclear.

In addition, since President Reagan proposed the construction of the U.S. strategic defense system on March 23, 1983, many components of the project have been developed and are waiting to be tested. For example, the "Delta-181 space test programme" cannot be used until its space-based kinetic weapons system (rail gun) has been shown to work.

Though U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz has told the public that no decision on deploying early elements of SDI would be made before the end of 1988, Weinberger's statement has elicited strong reactions from allies such as Britain, Federal Germany, Canada and Japan, who want to be consulted on the issue.

Debate on Capitol Hill has warmed up recently. SDI opponents, headed by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, warned that if the White House did not consult Congress and U.S. allies before making a decision, it "would provoke a constitutional confrontation of profound dimensions." He added that dissension on the part of Western allies "would put immense pressure on funding" and lead to further cuts in the SDI budget.

The committees defence bill for 1987 asked the government to not only "emphasize options for near-term deployment as a hedge" against a possible Soviet ABM break-out in the near-term, but also to consider adjusting the pace and scope of SDI once the Soviets agreed to "significant, stabilizing and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive forces."

Other lawmakers oppose using SDI as a bargaining chip but strongly support its early deployment. Among them is Congressman Kemp, who argued in a letter to Sam Nunn, "While you are debating terminology, the Soviets are deploying strategic defences."

On technical ground, deploying the first phase of SDI would be feasible only once some much-needed new technologies mature.

The original proposal for SDI to be completed in 20-30 years, called for it to be a layered, preferential defence system that could intercept attacking missiles at any of the four phases of flight launching, early and late mid-course, and terminal just before attacking. The cumulative effects would mean that if each tier could destroy only half of the attack force, 94 percent would be destroyed overall.

The first tier, which would destroy the multiple-warheads missiles within 3-5 minutes before the warheads scatter, involves "futuristic technologies" such as directed energy weapons (laser and particle beams), kinetic weapons system and advanced sensors. Considering how long it will take to perfect these new technologies, some people have suggested a "point defence" principle which would only protect U.S. missile bases. But this suggestion was overruled by Weinberger.

Under Weinberger's new timetable, SDI would still be designed as an impenetrable defensive shield over the entire United States. But there are rumours that the early deployment project will use more traditional technology instead of future technology.

The new system would still consist of three tiers, but could be more vulnerable due to the absence of some key components and technologies. Non-use of space rocket interceptors would allow many warheads to penetrate the first layer of the system and the second layer's ability to distinguish real warheads from dummies will be poorer. Moreover, only one layer of the three is space-based with small rockets mounted on hundreds of orbiting "garage" satellites, the other two would be ground-based. Even so, putting the 8 million pounds of components into orbit will require 125 flights by a space shuttle. Gerald Yonas, former chief scientist of the Strategic Defence Organization, said it would take 10 years to start the limited defence system.

Regarding taking advantage of the provisions of the ABM treaty, the Reagan administration has invoked agreed statement D, attached to the treaty, which says the treaty does not prohibit adopting new technologies for research and testing, but not deployment, of strategic defence. However, some former U.S. arms negotiators, such as Harold Brown, Gerard C. Smith and Raymond L. Garthoff, disagree with this interpretation. Garthoff maintains that the so-called new technology as well as traditional technology are prohibited by section 2 of the treaty, which forbids anti-missile systems, including present-day intercepting rockets, launchers and ABM radar. He also said the world currently (present day) should not be defined as "until now". Former Secretary of State Williams P. Rogers told Congress that section 2 applies to anti-missile systems which use either traditional or future technology.

A 1985 bill passed by Congress said SDI could not be deployed unless the President could offer clear evidence that its cost would be much less than that of the Soviet Union's counter-measures. So, in the absence of heavy pressure either from the Soviets or from Western allies, the lawmakers are unlikely to loosen the pursestrings.

The Soviet Union, absorbed in accelerating economic development and carrying out a "fundamental reform" of its economic structure, suggested early last month the withdrawal of medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe, and giving up the linkage between that issue and SDI, as it had insisted on at the Iceland summit. [paragraph continues]

In addition, Moscow recently proposed a ban on chemical weapons. The Soviets' new posture in arms control has further weakened the position of the U.S. hard-liners to accelerate SDI development and deployment.

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CSO: 5200/4096

## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

### GORBACHEV SPEECH AT KREMLIN LUNCHEON FOR JARUZELSKI

PM221209 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Apr 87 Second Edition p 2

["Text" of speech by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at a Kremlin luncheon in honor of Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State of Poland, on 21 April]

[Excerpt] Today, for obvious reasons, questions of eliminating both sides' medium-range missiles, operational and tactical missiles and also tactical nuclear systems in Europe are the focus of attention. The Soviet leadership consulted with leaders of the allied countries on the whole of these important problems and was given their complete support.

Last week U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and a large group of congressmen led by House Speaker Jim Wright visited Moscow. Serious talks were held. Both the United States and we attach much importance to them. What is our impression of those talks.

On the one hand, we saw a desire to revitalize dialogue and to better understand our intentions and the motivation of our actions. On the other, we saw anew how difficult it is to make real politics with the United States.

We explained over and again the need for balancing interests. The balance of interests means first and foremost a scrupulous taking into account of the military-strategic security of one's partner and the principle of equality in every aspect of armaments at every stage of their reduction. It means renunciation of the following: any attempt at diktat in foreign politics, at imposing one's views, let alone ways of doing things, and considering other countries and whole regions of the world to be one's fiefdom, known in the U.S. political language as the sphere of "U.S. vital interests."

We once again told our U.S. partners frankly and pointedly [predmetno]: Here is our view of the world. It is realistic and takes into consideration the controversies and interdependencies of everything and everyone. Its integrity and interdependence are objectively conditioned by economic, political, military, ecological, and all other circumstances. Therefore we told them let us consider how better to tackle problems. It makes no difference to us if the Republicans, Democrats, or anyone else are governing the United States. We will do business with those who represent the United States at the time.

What do we propose concretely in Europe?

First, to eliminate all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles already in Europe in the next five years, leaving only 100 warheads on these missiles each in the Asian portion of the USSR and in the United States.

Second, to simultaneously eliminate Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe and to hold talks on these missiles in the eastern USSR and in the territory of the United States.

Third, to establish the strictest verification system up to and including on-site inspections to ensure both sides comply with their obligations.

The Soviet delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva has been instructed to begin immediately on April 23, together with the U.S. delegation, to draw up concrete agreements on these issues.

Fourth, to examine and settle the matter of tactical missiles, in special multilateral talks according to the Budapest initiative of the USSR, Poland, and the other Warsaw Treaty member states on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

It transpired in the course of exchanges of views with George Shultz that the U.S. Administration is manifesting an intention to retreat from the positions agreed upon in Reykjavik. The United States is returning to "sublevels" in strategic offensive weapons, which in practice would lead to a breakdown in the structure of the Soviet strategic forces and detract from the USSR's security. The timeframe for 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive weapons is being arbitrarily stretched from five to seven years. The time during which the ABM Treaty will be respected, conversely, is being cut back from ten to seven years. We firmly stated that we do not agree to this departure from Reykjavik and to those U.S. proposals.

Simultaneously, we proposed that key provisions, so to speak, be formulated on the following matters:

-- on 50-percent cuts in the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States in conjunction with tackling the question of strengthening the ABM Treaty's regime during five years so that by this period's end each side should have not more than 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles (ICBM's, SLM's and heavy bombers) and not more than 6,000 nuclear warheads on these vehicles;

-- on a fundamental accord to strengthen the regime of the ABM Treaty, envisioning both sides, mutual obligation not to withdraw from the treaty for ten years and to strictly respect it. To this end agreement should be reached on a list of technology allowed or prohibited from being launched into outer space and on confining research into space ABM defenses to laboratories -- that is, to institutes, testing grounds, and factories on earth;

-- and finally, on full-scale talks with the United States to ban all nuclear testing in which agreement could be reached on a formula to ratify the so-called Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976 and to reach accord on substantial reductions in the yield and number of nuclear explosions.

We stated to the U.S. Administration our readiness to immediately begin formulating "key principles" on the above problems. In so doing, we proceed from the idea that, along with a treaty on medium-range missiles, they could become a subject of accord at the summit level.

There are lively and diverse reactions to our latest initiatives from all over the world. What is their gist? The main thing is, judging by various sources of information, that the Europeans, who are the first to be affected by our initiatives and to a larger extent than anyone else, approve and welcome our steps. We see that they have correctly understood us, namely, our desire to rid Europe of all nuclear weapons, to start the real process of demilitarization in the continent and to have national defenses kept at the minimum truly sensible level and on a perfectly equal and fair basis.

We are grateful to millions of Europeans for that understanding and trust.

As for the political circles, or rather the ruling circles of the NATO countries, we naturally could not have failed to notice a positive reaction to the Moscow talks from the U.S. President, although he voiced his optimism in a rather abstract manner. We have also noticed the signs of an all too familiar gambit, with "Ivan pointing to Petr and Petr to Ivan," as we say. The European leaders tell us that it is up to us, Soviets and Americans, to agree on the elimination of our missiles, etc., while the United States says it is not against this -- but that its allies hesitate and the U.S. has to respect its Atlantic commitments. It is clear that if this swing is again set in motion, nothing good will come out of it.

Naturally, agreements on nuclear disarmament will call for great efforts and political will on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States. We are not wanting in resolve and political will in the struggle for nuclear-free world. We are glad to have by our side in these efforts our dependable Polish friends, other fraternal socialist countries, and all the peace forces. The matter now is up to the United States and its European allies, and we have every reason to expect from them a constructive reply that would be acceptable to our proposals. History and the peoples will never forgive those politicians who refuse to make use of the existing unique chance to take a major step towards a nuclear-free world.

I must say that those who think that it only takes some pressure on the Soviet Union to force it to meet the West halfway badly delude themselves. It is time to realize that it is futile to talk to us from the position of strength. We are looking for ways to disarmament not because we are weak or fear anyone but because we are honestly committed to the cause of peace and put the task of saving the human race above everything else.

It is time to begin restructuring the entire system of international relations so that strength, especially military strength, should never again be a means of settling international problems. It is not the arguments of weapons but the weapons of arguments for peace that should determine mankind's fate. This is what the Soviet Union, Poland, and other socialist countries are fighting for.

Permit me to tell Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, his esteemed wife, and other Polish comrades here "Sto lat" [traditional Polish greeting] according to the Polish custom.

We ask Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski to convey from the Soviet leadership, the communists of the Soviet Union, and all the Soviet people cordial greetings and best wishes to the Polish leaders, communists, and other people of fraternal Poland.

May Soviet-Polish friendship and our cooperation grow stronger and richer with new contents.

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CSO: 5200/1437

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV INTERVIEWED ON REYKJAVIK 'PACKAGE', INF, SDI

DW140651 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 Apr 87 pp 142-147

[Interview with Soviet disarmament expert Viktor Karpov by correspondents Siegesmund von Ilseman and Joerg R. Mettke in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Ambassador: Do you think there will be an agreement on the withdrawal of all intermediate-range weapons from Europe this year?

Karpov: Yes, that is possible if both sides show their good will, if both sides proceed from the Reykjavik summit results, and if neither side erects obstacles along that path.

SPIEGEL: That does not really sound enthusiastic. In recent weeks you sharply criticized the U.S. position at the Geneva talks. Was that a negotiating tactic, or do you really take a dim view of things?

Karpov: I proceed from the state of the negotiations, and I certainly do not overrate the U.S. position. Of course, I see obstacles that still remain. If we do not remove them, then prospects for the negotiations are really clouded. For that reason there are many "ifs" to my answer. If they are all taken into account, then we will indeed reach an agreement. But if even one single "if" remains open, then there will not be a positive result. As far as we are concerned, we have positive answers to all those "ifs", and we would be glad if that were also the case with our negotiating partners.

SPIEGEL: But the Americans still appear to you as brakemen?

Karpov: The Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons have been in session for more than 2 years -- Since March 1985 -- without there having been any definite result so far. The talks are going in circles. The Soviet Reykjavik initiative has -- as never before -- revealed all the dead-ends of the negotiations, for which, to put it frankly, it is not we who are to blame.

SPIEGEL: The Americans also believe they are not guilty.

Karpov: But those courageous decisions that Mikhail Gorbachev brought into the game might really become an Archimedes screw. Turning the earth around nowadays means halting the arms race, eliminating nuclear weapons, building a comprehensive security system for a world without violence and war. Unfortunately the United States is not pursuing that path. It is trying to creep back from the main road into the dead-ends where we were before Reykjavik.

SPIEGEL: Yet the zero-option was an American proposal.

Karpov: There is reason to doubt the sincerity of the zero-option that was proposed in 1981. The Irish writer Oscar Wilde, known as a master of paradox, remarked sharply: "When the gods want to punish us, they answer our prayers." The United States is dealing with our proposal to eliminate the Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range weapons in Europe in much the same way.

SPIEGEL: Will the espionage fuss over the U.S. Embassy in Moscow complicate the talks with Secretary of State George Shultz?

Karpov: As to the espionage affair, you have to look at it with a sense of humor. If some Marines could not resist the charms of Russian girls, well then, they were not very steadfast, despite their discipline. But it has been found that not just Russian girls were involved -- they even tried to rape an English woman. That is really a joke.

SPIEGEL: But Ronald Reagan announced that Secretary of State Shultz would discuss primarily that subject during his Moscow visit.

Karpov: If Mr Shultz comes to us without constructive concepts, and if he thinks the Marines should be the main topic of his talks, then he cannot expect meaningful results. The U.S. side should not focus on the safety of Marines who could not defend themselves, let alone their embassy. Security on a broader scope must be the topic -- the nuclear arms race, to avoid space weapons, and so on. If Secretary of State Shultz comes to us in order to resolve those issues, then we are prepared to do it. If he just wants to raise artificial issues, then there will be no serious talk.

SPIEGEL: Shultz has already suggested that he hopes the Soviet side makes even further concessions. Do you have anything else to offer him?

Karpov: What kind of concessions should that be? To make concessions would require positive acts by the United States. Where do you see such positive acts? It is we who expect concessions. We expect Mr Shultz to come to Moscow with positive answers to our initiatives, primarily to our proposal to work out immediately an agreement on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe. We really are prepared to discuss all the other problems with him, problems of nuclear and space weapons -- in the spirit that those questions have already been treated in Reykjavik. If Mr Shultz is prepared to continue the path that was taken in Reykjavik -- and not go back on that path -- then he can expect us to make concessions.

SPIEGEL: That flexibility you are hoping for -- do you see any signs of it on the U.S. side?

Karpov: Not yet.

SPIEGEL: Suppose you really might agree upon the so-called zero-option. Can one really effectively control it at all?

Karpov: Oh yes, It is possible. We are prepared to accept controls that will not give rise to any doubts, on the U.S. side or on ours, that the other side might not entirely comply with the agreements. We are prepared and agree that all missile bases -- Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, as well as SS-20's -- be completely open to



inspection. We are prepared for on-site inspections, so that we will have the opportunity for supervision on the territories of the FRG, England, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy -- everywhere there are U.S. missiles. Any possibility of concealing such weapons on those U.S. missile bases and bypassing the agreements must be eliminated.

SPIEGEL: That will have to apply to your missile bases, too.

Karpov: We are interested in total supervision by all parties involved. The destruction of such weapons must also be strictly supervised. We not only support the destruction of the missiles and their launching sites, but further, we support the elimination of the infrastructure, the bases, in order to make it impossible to launch missiles from them ever again. All that applies, of course, to our own bases as well.

SPIEGEL: How does one prevent intermediate-range weapons from being built secretly?

Karpov: The production of intermediate-range weapons, too, should be strictly controlled. American companies like Martin Marietta that are producing such weapons should keep their doors open to our inspectors. We promise to open such plants to the Americans in our country. However, we have little hope that the Americans will agree to that. Much of the U.S. position indicates that they would like to bypass such a strict control system. Well, we shall see.

SPIEGEL: Would control not be much easier if all of the intermediate-range weapons were eliminated instead of maintaining a certain number in Siberia or in North America?

Karpov: What would it change? Those missiles with 100 warheads that we maintain in Asia, and the Americans in their country, are capable of being controlled. There will be no problems at all from those few missiles.

SPIEGEL: For what purpose does one need those 100 warheads at all?

Karpov: Our intermediate-range missiles based in Europe are the counterpart to U.S. missiles based there. Our intermediate-range missiles remaining in Asia are supposed to balance those nuclear forces that the United States maintains in that area.

SPIEGEL: Which U.S. nuclear weapons do you mean?

Karpov: In Asia there is an extensive network of U.S. nuclear weapons bases. For example Misawa, Japan is now a base for U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers. In South Korea, Washington has deployed "Lance" missiles. We cannot do without all the SS-20's based in Asia, because this is possibly just the beginning of U.S. nuclear armament in Asia, which might soon be escalated with longer-range nuclear weapons.

SPIEGEL: An international ban on all intermediate-range missiles would neutralize that danger.

Karpov: If you mean just missiles, then I am not convinced, because the U.S. is not only rearming with missiles, but primarily with combat aircraft that increasingly have the capability of carrying nuclear weapons. Although we have urged it for many years, Washington is not prepared to negotiate with us on air defense below the level of the strategic bomber.

SPIEGEL: The Soviet Union for years has rejected on-site inspections and considered them espionage attempts by the West. Is your preparedness for comprehensive controls the result of that "new thinking" that General Secretary Gorbachev is requiring domestically and toward the outside?

Karpov: In former times conservative views about control and openness prevailed in our country. We want to break away from it now. Today we are facing very definite disarmament steps, and we need definite control procedures -- real disarmament requires real control. That is our conviction.

SPIEGEL: Under Gorbachev, your government has made many concessions that would have been inconceivable under his predecessors. Now it even seems as if you are putting aside the main goal -- preventing SDI. [paragraph continues]

Is the thesis of American hawks then correct that one only needs to put a good deal of pressure on the Soviets for them finally to give in?

Karpov: It is good when we make concessions to common sense. America's hawks should do the same, too. Of course, we are not waiving our proposals to prevent the arms race in space. Without solving the SDI problem, without strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty -- we are sticking to our position on that -- there will be no reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

SPIEGEL: But Gorbachev has separated the intermediate-range issue from SDI.

Karpov: In doing so, we gave in to the strong desire of Western politicians and statesmen, as well as the Western public, to untie that Reykjavik package. In Reykjavik, the intermediate-range missiles were not connected directly to the space weapons issue.

SPIEGEL: However during the summit, and even after it, your government required a complex solution.

Karpov: In Reykjavik we wanted a fundamental breakthrough in solving problems in three areas: space, strategic offensive weapons, and intermediate-range missiles. In the last 6 months, however, we found that approach to be unrealistic. Now we want to cut back on our own expectations and achieve a breakthrough in one area first -- in intermediate-range missiles. There were assertions in the West that if we removed the intermediate-range missiles from the overall package, then an agreement might quickly be reached. Now that we have done it, new obstacles are being erected.

SPIEGEL: Which ones?

Karpov: Obstacles that did not exist before. For example, the U.S. plans to modify the Pershing-2 to a Pershing-1B with a shorter range, or not to scrap cruise missiles, but modify them to have conventional warheads, or even put them to sea.

SPIEGEL: What can the Soviet Union do about that?

Karpov: Suppose we granted the United States the right to modify their Pershing-2s. Today's infrastructure would in fact remain and those systems might very simply be remodified to nuclear intermediate-range weapons. Let us go on supposing we would pose the issue of maintaining our SS-20's in Europe. We might modify them to ballistic missiles. That would not affect European security, because the missiles might then be used for a counterattack against the United States, but that would just be a phony solution, which we will not agree to.

SPIEGEL: Supervision might prevent modified intermediate-range missiles from being reconverted.

Karpov: Of course we might establish that each single weapon of that kind be watched by one Soviet soldier who, for example, constantly checks to see whether a cruise missile is equipped with a nuclear warhead or not. We will be happy to send a regiment of our troops to the United States for that purpose. But, to be serious, the reduction of one weapons category by converting it into another cannot be a solution. The only thing that elimination can mean is complete removal, including the whole infrastructure, the sites, and the support facilities.

SPIEGEL: But there are qualms about that in Western Europe, too.

Karpov: I read that political circles in the FRG are currently discussing the topic and have split opinions about it. Some are of the opinion that they must support the United States and continue to have U.S. missiles on the European continent, if under a different name. Others advocate scrapping all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range weapons in Europe.

In the past, the NATO two-track decision was justified by maintaining that the Soviet-SS-20's represented a threat to Europe's security, and that consequently, a balance should be struck or the missiles eliminated. Now that the Soviet Union is prepared to abolish its SS-20 missiles, suddenly a counterweight to Soviet tactical missiles is demanded. They were definitely not discussed when the so-called NATO two-track decision was accepted.

SPIEGEL: Do you think NATO's position that Moscow's preponderance in nuclear weapons with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km must somehow be balanced is entirely out of line?

Karpov: Let us proceed from NATO's figures, according to which we have 130 to 150 missiles with such a range in Europe. The Bundeswehr has 72 Pershing-1 missiles. That is not a gigantic difference. Nevertheless, we are prepared to rectify that imbalance, but by disarmament, not rearmament. We indeed offered the Americans a zero-option for those tactical missiles.

SPIEGEL: With the same opportunities of verification as in the case of the longer range intermediate-range missiles?

Karpov: Yes, exactly.

SPIEGEL: The Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972, currently the only legally valid weapons control agreement between Moscow and Washington, has meanwhile been interpreted "broadly" by the United States. You regard that as inadmissible.

Karpov: The so-called extended interpretation of the treaty owes its origin to the SDI program. Until October 1985, the USSR and the United States were in agreement about what the ABM Treaty meant. It is not a question of some "narrow" interpretation opposing a "broad" one. The point is that the Soviet Union proceeds exclusively from the treaty's contents, from its text, from the agreed-upon declarations, and from the general understanding. All things together are indispensable components of the treaty.

SPIEGEL: What exactly does the ABM Treaty prohibit? What does it permit?

Karpov: The ABM Treaty unequivocally prohibits the development, testing, and especially the creation of a strategic defense the way the U.S. Government intend's to do. That does not mean that research in the field of antimissile systems or their components would be inadmissible. Such research, such developments are possible within the framework provided by the treaty -- exclusively in order to deploy land-based antimissile weapons in that one area that is permitted to the United States by the ABM treaty.

SPIEGEL: Consequently, no research at all on space weapons?

Karpov: Deploying, developing, and testing antimissile systems or their components in space is inadmissible. Paragraph 5 of the ABM Treaty expressly prohibits it.

SPIEGEL: Washington criticizes you for working on space weapons yourselves. Did your experts possibly establish that they might benefit militarily from it?

Karpov: Our experts believe that there cannot be any antimissile defense shield that is impermeable. That opinion corresponds to the state of the scientific art East and West. We can invalidate militarily any conceivable antimissile defense system with but a small portion of the expense. The United States invests in space weaponry. Even a defense shield with 90 percent effectiveness would let pass 1,000 Soviet warheads out of 10,000 -- and that would be the end of the United States. Of course, the same would be true of a Soviet defense system.

SPIEGEL: Why then the fear of SDI?

Karpov: We are against the arms race in space because it makes the world shakier: Imagine what would happen if that system of maybe several thousand satellites, equipped with weapons that may not just be directed against space targets, but against targets on earth, has a malfunction. Such a system must react within seconds -- the moment the order has been given. That can only be done by computer, but computers that must conduct many millions of calculations in a second cannot work without making errors. It takes just one incorrectly interpreted signal, just one incorrectly programmed order. On the basis of such a wrong order World War III could be triggered without any one person being able to prevent it.

SPIEGEL: Are you unwilling to prepare for such a computer war?

Karpov: After having carefully considered the pros and cons, we decided not to copy the American SDI program. We cannot see any sense in it. If the United States still harbors the hope of getting us involved in that competition, thus making us spend billions and billions [no currency mentioned] then they are wrong. We will not do that.

SPIEGEL: There may be other reasons for rejecting SDI. Byproducts of space weapons -- highly developed sensors, high-precision miniature projectiles, or laser weapons -- might revolutionize conventional weaponry, too.

Karpov: We are concerned that there is constant research on newer methods to destroy people. To avoid it, we are trying hard to spare space from the weapons race. You talk about byproducts of the SDI program. Laser research is nothing new. We also have it. But that by no means implies that such research must lead to space weaponry. We have plants where lasers are already substituting for conventional drills.

SPIEGEL: How will you ensure the exclusively peaceful use of that research?

Karpov: In the middle of March we proposed at the Geneva disarmament conference an international system to ensure the exclusively peaceful use of space.

SPIEGEL: How would it work?

Karpov: We suggested that all countries could control what is being sent into space. If some country had doubts about the peaceful character of a missile or a spaceship, an international inspection would take place. We are prepared to open our launching pads, such as Baikonur, to such inspections.

SPIEGEL: Why does Moscow not give a practical signal through additional confidence-building measures, which would certainly impress the West more than the steady stream of new, voluminous disarmament proposals?

Karpov: Since 1 January this year confidence-building measures have been in force that were decided upon and approved by the 1986 CDE conference in Stockholm. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries fully adhere to the agreements. Even more so, the CSSR announced a maneuver from 2 to 6 February 1987, it invited foreign observers, although it was not compelled to do so as the agreed 42-day limit since the treaty's coming into effect had not expired.

However -- The United States -- which had generally adhered to the Stockholm agreement to date -- could also give some sign, but it did not inform us about a staff framework exercise held on FRG territory in January and February with 23,000 troops. As to the nuclear test issue, we also fail to detect U.S. confidence-building reactions. The year and a half Soviet test moratorium has incontestably demonstrated to the whole world how nuclear tests can not only be discontinued, but how they can be ended in a controllable way.

SPIEGEL: The United States maintains that nuclear tests are necessary as long as there are nuclear weapons.

Karpov: We are convinced that renunciation of nuclear tests is already possible. It would be important from the standpoint of environmental protection, but also because the further development of nuclear weapons would at least be slowed down. However, we have found that the other nuclear powers are not prepared for such a radical solution, so now we are flexible there too. We are prepared to discontinue the testing of nuclear weapons step by step.

SPIEGEL: The United States wants to ratify the underground nuclear test treaties of 1974 and 1976 if a new control system were decided upon.

Karpov: The Soviet Union is for comprehensive controls in that field also, so as to rule out any violation of a future agreement on a test ban.

SPIEGEL: What would you say to a Western European who believes that after the elimination of all nuclear weapons he would have more to fear from the Soviet Union conventional superiority.

Karpov: Let us assume that all nuclear weapons were eliminated. There would still be billions of people with bayonets, pistols, or clubs. We need a security system that completely rules out violence in society. We are prepared to eliminate not only nuclear weapons in Europe, but also other means of warfare. We want to begin with the most dangerous weapon systems so that no offensive war can be waged any more. We suggested that in the 1986 Budapest appeal.

SPIEGEL: What do your generals say to your proposal to deprive them of more and more weapons?

Karpov: Our military representatives thought it over and said if a system were created guaranteeing our security without heaps of weaponry, we would agree. It is important to create conditions permitting people to live together without weaponry.

SPIEGEL: Particularly because the arms race has become very expensive -- especially for a country like the Soviet Union, which has set very high economic goals for itself.

Karpov: It is not just military expenditures that are involved, but the fact that a part of the populace is working most unproductively for the military apparatus. That is a waste of material and human resources. We want the military to be reduced to a minimum -- down to merely a police or militia. We propose to achieve that goal gradually. Disarmament is an ideal of socialism. It is not propaganda. It is the expression of our wish not to spend our money for military purposes, but for the benefit of our people.

SPIEGEL: Gorbachev's ambitious economic program does not go hand-in-hand with a stepped-up arms race. Does it not confirm the American thesis that one can arm the Soviet Union to death?

Karpov: It has been tried, in World War II, for example, and yet we won. It was tried again after the war, and yet we have built our society. Now we have set new tasks for ourselves, and again it is said, maybe it will be possible to arm the Soviet Union to death. However, it will not work this time either, just as it has not worked for 70 years. We have vast potential that has not been tapped; freeing it is the goal of our restructuring. With that restructuring it will be possible for us to overcome all the obstacles on the path to developing our society and our economy.

SPIEGEL: What if you had to continue arming?

Karpov: Naturally, a continued arms race would hinder our development. However, we would to it anyway.

SPIEGEL: What must actually happen for Mikhail Gorbachev to be able to continue his socialist disarmament policy, as you have outlined it, with a summit meeting in Washington?

Karpov: Not much must happen. We must keep our eye on the crane in the sky, but keep the sparrow in hand, that is, we must continue striving toward our goal -- the elimination of all nuclear weapons -- and at the same time accept partial success. Comrade Gorbachev has frequently said that we must continue talking with President Reagan. For a successful meeting in Washington we need the opportunity to achieve success on one, two, or three important security policy issues. If the Americans are prepared to find a solution to essential security policy issues together with us, such a summit can still be achieved this year.

SPIEGEL: Mr Ambassador, we thank you for this talk.

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

### USSR'S KARPOV ANALYZES STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS

DW151011 Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Apr 87 p 8

[Article by USSR disarmament expert Viktor Karpov: "Moscow: The United States Burdens the Geneva Talks With New Conditions"]

[Text] The fact the Soviet and U.S. delegations in Geneva have begun to work on a common draft on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe marks undoubtedly remarkable progress in the negotiations. However, it would still be too early to discuss when this work will be completed and whether it will lead to a treaty containing agreement on all points ready to be signed.

Current discussions show that there is a basis for a common draft. It has been agreed upon in Reykjavik and its exact fixing in the form of concrete stipulations would be a guarantee that the problem of eliminating U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe will be resolved.

However, the following is alarming: As soon as the Soviet Union has opened the Reykjavik package, separating medium-range missiles from other nuclear and space weapons problems, the U.S. delegation submitted its own draft, thus wrapping up a new package, although it supports verbally a separate solution of the medium-range missiles problem.

What does a new package consist of? A link is being established between an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe and a solution of the problem of operational and tactical missiles, under the pretext that after the removal of the Soviet SS-20 and the U.S. Pershing-2 missiles and long-range cruise missiles, Europe will be exposed without protection from the USSR because of Soviet superiority in operational and tactical missiles.

If we analyze the general ratio of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, including British and French nuclear weapons, the absolute unfoundedness of that thesis becomes obvious. The one who asserts this forgets that in 1979, when NATO made the so-called dual-track decision, a U.S. renunciation of deploying its medium-range missiles in Europe was made dependent only -- I want to point that out -- on the elimination of Soviet SS-20 missiles and not also on that of operational and tactical missiles.

Now, however, when the practical possibility arises to agree on freeing Europe from all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles, additional conditions are being made that were not mentioned before. Thus -- just because they presuppose that negotiations on operational and tactical missiles are part of the negotiations on medium-range missiles -- new problems are being inevitably created.



Alarming also is the circumstance that the U.S. side is counting on the possibility of converting the Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1B missiles to keep them in that form on European territory. Experts, among them Americans, maintain that this rebuilding will be no problem, but it would be also no problem to reconvert them. Under these circumstances the U.S. medium-range potential would actually remain in Europe. If one adds that the United States envisages not the elimination of cruise missiles but their possible deployment on ships or the replacement of nuclear warheads by non-nuclear ones, an absolutely clear picture comes out: Under the label "elimination" of medium-range missiles" an operation is to be started to preserve the U.S. nuclear potentials in Europe.

Let us assume the Soviet Union were to agree to such action, reserving the right to itself, as a return concession, to rebuild their SS-20 missiles into ballistic intercontinental missiles. In this case the nuclear danger would not increase for Europe. But with regard to the United States the Soviet counterblow potential would increase by 243 missiles. I believe something like that could hardly mean more security for the United States.

That is not a path on which the Soviet side wants to embark. We are against an increase of nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the United States; we support the dismantling and complete elimination of the nuclear danger. Therefore, we do not want the negotiations on medium-range missiles to lead to decisions that would amount to the fixing of nuclear confrontation in Europe on a high level, although under a different label. We are for the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. We support eliminating other missiles -- operational and tactical missiles, missiles with a short range -- from European territory.

Basically the problem looks as follows: If the United States will actually stick with the mutual understanding on medium-range missiles achieved in Reykjavik, it must dismantle the obstacles it has piled up on the way to a solution. The question I recently asked in an IZVESTIYA interview remains: Is the U.S. zero option for medium-range missiles in Europe only a bluff?

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS HITS REAGAN 10 APRIL LOS ANGELES SPEECH

### 'Sidesteps' INF Question

PM111741 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "R. Reagan Speech"]

[Text] Washington, 11 Apr--Addressing the World Affairs Council of Southern California in Los Angeles Friday, U.S. President Reagan swelt on USSR-U.S. relations. Assessing their present state, he said: If I had to describe these relations in one word, I would perhaps chose the word "developing." There are no particular reasons for euphoria, but there are no particular reasons for alarm. Maybe this is precisely the kind of description which should be given to relations with your opponent.

Throughout the speech the head of the White House repeatedly asserted that his administration's priority task in the field of USSR-U.S. relations is to "seek a verifiable and stabilizing reduction in arms with the emphasis on verifiability." At the same time he gave no indication of his attitude to the specific Soviet proposals on elaborating the most stringent measures, including on-site inspection, to verify the fulfillment on the commitments adopted by the sides at all stages of nuclear disarmament advanced in Prague by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, yesterday.

The U.S. President sidestepped a question put to him as to whether any obstacles at the talks on medium-range missiles have been removed by the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles in Europe and operational and tactical missiles on the European continent. Instead of replying he repeated the American position: We have never believed in linking these two arms systems. Among ourselves, however, we believed that talks (on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles) should be conducted simultaneously. In his speech Reagan expressed the view that now "there is a real possibility of a breakthrough at the talks on medium-range missiles," although he also stressed that "serious problems remain."

Reagan stated that the Soviet Union allegedly possesses an "immense advantage" in shorter-range missiles in Europe. Yet such assertions are not supported even by American specialists. According to their estimates, cited in THE WASHINGTON POST recently, the United States has approximately 5,000 units of

nuclear weapons in Europe, which greatly exceeds even Pentagon figures for Soviet tactical nuclear arms in the region.

While declaring the United States' desire to reduce strategic offensive arms, the head of the U.S. Administration said: I agree with General Secretary Gorbachev in condemning the strategy of the "balance of fear" as a means of preserving peace. In place of this strategy he offered... the same old "Strategic Defense Initiative," which, as is known, is aimed at shifting the nuclear arms race into space and consequently cranking up the nuclear arms race.

#### Defends SDI

LD102347 Moscow TASS in English 2225 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Washington, 11 Apr (TASS)--Delivering a speech on foreign policy issues at the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, California, President Reagan said that he agreed with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in discussing the "balance of fear" strategy which, as the President put it, is designed to preserve peace.

What does Reagan suggest for this? The self-same "Strategic Defense Initiative" which, in the opinion of the U.S. Administration, aims at ridding the world of nuclear weapons but in actual fact has as its goal to spread the arms race into space.

The President advocated a radical cut in offensive missiles as though he did not see the circumstance that SDI cannot lead to this result but, conversely, will force the side against which it is aimed to take measures to neutralize it.

The President also denounced violations of the sovereignty of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow allegedly committed by the Soviet Union. He passed over in silence, however, the documentary evidence, submitted at the press conference in Moscow and in Washington and widely covered by the U.S. press, of generous equipment of office buildings of the USSR's Embassy and other Soviet institutions in the United States with eavesdropping devices.

#### 'Serious Problems' at Talks

LD111516 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0230 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Excerpt] Washington, 11 Apr (TASS)--TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports: Delivering a speech on foreign policy issues at the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on Friday, President Reagan expressed satisfaction at the new proposal advanced in the speech by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Prague concerning the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

Reagan expressed the view that at present "there is a real possibility of a breakthrough in the realm of the medium-range missiles," although he also stressed that "there remain serious problems." Moreover, he asserted that the Soviet

Union allegedly has "immense superiority" in lesser-range missiles in Europe. These conclusions are not supported even by American specialists. According to their estimates, cited recently in the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, the United States has around 5,000 units of nuclear weapons in the European theater, which is very much in excess of even Pentagon figures for the number of units of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in the region.

The President went on to talk about the U.S. desire to reduce strategic offensive weapons. I, the President said, agree with General Secretary Gorbachev in condemning the strategy of the "balance of fear" as a means of maintaining the peace. However, in place of this strategy, the head of the White House proposed the very same "Strategic Defense Initiative," which, according to the administration, is aimed at ridding the world of nuclear weapons, but is actually aimed at transferring the nuclear arms race into space, and thus at whipping up the race in all nuclear weapons generally. Nevertheless, the President has repeatedly stated that the paramount task of his administration in the realm of Soviet-American relations is "to achieve a verifiable reduction of weapons leading to stabilization of the situation, with the emphasis on verification." However, while putting the "emphasis on verification," the President did not react at all to the specific Soviet proposal for systems of universal inspection [Proverka] of implementation of agreements, that M.S. Gorbachev spoke of in Prague.

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: REAGAN MOVING AWAY FROM REYKJAVIK STANCE

LD141542 Moscow TASS in English 1351 GMT 14 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 14 TASS -- TASS writer on military matters Vladimir Bogachev writes:

To judge by American press reports, President Ronald Reagan continues moving away from the accords reached in Reykjavik. This is evidenced by the instructions prepared for Secretary of State George Shultz now holding talks in Moscow.

The new revision of the Reykjavik accords is seen by observers as a victory for the Pentagon's Caspar Weinberger and as a toughening of the administration's approaches to the entire spectrum of arms control issues.

The point at issue is the intention of the U.S. Administration to reduce the time limits for the observance of the 1972 treaty from 10 years -- as was agreed upon in Reykjavik -- to 5 years, prolongation of the period of fifty percent reduction in strategic arms from five to seven years, revision of accords on medium-range missiles in order to raise new obstacles on the way to achieving an appropriate Soviet-American agreement.

At a briefing for journalists in Santa Barbara (California state) Howard Baker, head of White House staff, admitted that the Reykjavik accords widely differ from the instructions received by Secretary of State George Shultz for his talks in Moscow.

Assistant to the U.S. President for national security affairs Frank Carlucci assured journalists in his extremely muddled statement, contrary to commonly known facts, that in Reykjavik the Soviet side allegedly did not like the proposal for reducing strategic missiles to a zero and that therefore, he said, Shultz's discussions in Moscow would not be focussed on observance of the treaty on the limitation of anti-missile systems in the course of ten years.

Carlucci's assertion sounded strange, to say the least, and was evidently intended for ill-informed people. Indeed, it was the Soviet Union that came up on January 15, 1986, with an initiative for complete liquidation of all nuclear arms, including strategic ones, by the end of this century, and it consistently adheres to this position at all talks.

Officials of the U.S. Administration now put forward proposals not for reducing and eliminating theatre missiles in Europe but for further increasing the American potential of these nuclear systems. In Washington they voice "arguments" also against measures to ensure reliable verification of the observance of the agreement on medium-range missiles.

Carlucci, Baker and other representatives of Washington are assuring the public, with suspicious zeal, that the instructions given to Secretary of State Shultz for his talks in Moscow were worked out in the administration almost unanimously and that President Reagan is interested in achieving agreement on arms control. But facts testify to the contrary.

Representatives of the Reagan administration are again showing an acute shortage of common sense in their approaches to the working out of mutually acceptable solutions. The United States' new deep departure from the Reykjavik accords casts doubt on Washington's reputation as a negotiating partners.

It is now necessary more than ever before that the Reagan administration should display, at long last, goodwill in matters of arms limitation and reduction and demonstrate not in words but in deeds its readiness to move the talks on nuclear and space arms off dead centre.

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

### TASS SCORES REAGAN 18 APRIL RADIO ADDRESS

#### Actions 'Far Removed' From Promises

LD182359 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2220 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Excerpt] Washington, 19 Apr (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

President Reagan has devoted his latest Saturday radio broadcast entirely to matters involving Soviet-U.S. relations and prospects for concluding a new agreement in the area of arms control.

"Today," he said, "the United States and the Soviet Union have the opportunity, step by step, to achieve tangible progress in safeguarding a more secure world. This is in accordance with the interests of both sides. Nowhere is this more obvious than in our talks on reducing the number of nuclear weapons threatening mankind." The President noted that most real of all are prospects for concluding a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range systems. But here too, stated the President "significant problems have still to be resolved." He stressed that the matter of an agreement on medium range systems will be "thoroughly" considered by the administration. "Our aim is to build a more secure world," the President assured his fellow countrymen.

However, if the U.S. policies were really built on such logical premises, then it would be possible to speak with confidence about positive, and very promising prospects, for talks between the USSR and the United States on all levels. But the fact is, that the practical actions of the White House are, for the present, far removed from the promises to secure a "more secure world" on earth. It is precisely the present administration that has coarsely trampled on the temporary agreement on SALT I, and the SALT II treaty, which served as tough barriers against the quantitative increase of strategic offensive weapons. It is precisely this administration that answers with a stubborn refusal the repeated proposals of the Soviet Union to immediately introduce a mutual moratorium on all nuclear explosions, and to start negotiations, without delay, on a total and universal ban on nuclear testing.

It is precisely the Reagan administration that does not stop undermining the ABM Treaty, which is regarded by the Pentagon as an obstacle on the way to the implementation of its "Star Wars" program. In his radio address the President has completely ignored the question of the "Strategic Defense Initiative." But Kenneth Adelman, director of the Agency for Arms and Disarmament Control, who was making a speech the same day in the CNN Television company program, specifically called the possibility of "reaching a real compromise on SDI" "unlikely." Having underlined the administration's adherence to this program, which threatens to transfer the arms race into space, Adelman pointed out, that "SDI is beginning to have a life of its own."

The director of the government department, whose function, delineated in his very title, is to make a substantial contribution to the cause of disarmament, was quite frank in setting out the "philosophy" of the approach of the current U.S. Administration to the entire process of arms control. "It should never be thought that this agreement (on medium range missiles in Europe) or any other treaty in the area of arms control will resolve all our problems of safeguarding security. That is certainly not the case. Arms control may help at times, but you can forget the idea that it might solve the problem." So that while doing a great deal of talking about its adherence "to real reductions in nuclear weapons," the Reagan administration is not going to seriously try to achieve them in reality. [passage omitted]

#### Hopes for Agreement

Moscow TASS in English 1130 GMT 19 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 19 TASS -- President Reagan has devoted his latest regular radio address completely to the U.S.-Soviet relationship, in particular the results of Secretary of State George Shultz' visit to Moscow.

"I'm pleased that the word from that trip is good," he said.

"Today the United States and the Soviet Union have an opportunity to take tangible step-by-step progress towards a more peaceful world," he continued.

"This is in both our interest.

"Nowhere is that more evident than in our talks about reducing the number of nuclear weapons threatening mankind.

"An actual reduction in the number of nuclear weapons would be an historic first -- an accomplishment both sides could build upon for further progress," President Reagan said.

Secretary Shultz, he went on to say, had told him that his talks in Moscow had left him optimistic that an agreement to reduce the number of medium-range missiles was "within reach."

"Significant issues remain, and our negotiators will intensify their efforts to clear them away when talks resume in Geneva later this month," Reagan continued.

He said that consultations with the U.S. allies would continue and that when he returned to Washington, he would meet with the bi-partisan congressional leadership to review the progress.

"It's my hope that the process now underway continues to move forward, and that Mr. Gorbachev and I can complete an historic agreement on East-West relations at a summit meeting," the U.S. President added.

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS: 'ICE NOT BROKEN'

PM221005 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

["International Review" by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov]

[Excerpt] Has the Ice Been Broken?

I think it is quite appropriate to begin a review of international events over the past week with precisely this question. Did the 3-day talks between the Soviet leaders and the U.S. secretary of state lead to any real progress in resolving the vital problems of disarmament? Official circles in Moscow and Washington positively assess the results of this exchange of opinions.

The Soviet appraisals are restrainedly positive: Central questions of international security and Soviet-U.S. relations were discussed and greater understanding of one another's positions was reached, which creates the preconditions for narrowing the gap between them in the future. The White House (which moved to California for the Easter vacation) is perhaps placing greater emphasis on the progress made, which gives hope for an agreement.

Nevertheless, one somehow cannot bring oneself to unequivocally conclude that the ice has finally been broken and that an agreement will be reached. We are particularly put on our guard by the fact that our Western partners react to every new Soviet step not so much with a step forward as a step back (appropriate at a dance but certainly not in politics). This is unfortunately still the case.

Our new proposals made last week in Prague and this week in Moscow open up favorable prospects for working out a treaty on medium-range missiles and for making progress in other areas of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. The U.S. Administration, however, has proved to be unready to make a constructive response to Moscow's initiatives and go its part of the way toward a mutually acceptable accord. The U.S. secretary of state essentially gave no response to the proposals made to him in Moscow, saying he would have to consult with the allies.

Although Washington far from always considers this necessary, in this particular case we are talking about a problem that is by no means a matter of indifference to the West Europeans and affects their interests. The administration itself must be given the opportunity to think everything over, so in this case consultations are quite appropriate, as long as they are not turned into a screen for dragging out the process of reaching the necessary decisions.

There was a time when the leaders of the West European NATO countries willingly portrayed themselves as champions of nuclear disarmament. We would gladly be rid of U.S. and Soviet missiles, they said, but Washington is quite unable to reach an agreement with Moscow. Now, however, to all appearances the partners have exchanged roles. Now the U.S. Administration is not against hiding behind the allies, still unable to find the courage to part with even a fraction of its nuclear arsenals.

According to BELGA, it will take 1-2 months before NATO will be able to work out a unified response to the new Soviet proposals. This is not very hopeful. And the substance of the discussions held in Brussels on 16 April? The tenor of the responses from NATO politicians was, to put it mildly, paradoxical: "We have reached a very dangerous stage. We must be doubly vigilant: The Russians are on the offensive again. Moscow is cunningly trying to lure NATO into a trap -- the trap called a nuclear-free Europe." This could be considered farcical if it were not for the fact that this kind of shortsightedness threatens to end in tragedy.

As a result of the conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Shultz, an agreement in principle was reached to jointly speed up work to implement the Reykjavik accord on medium-range missiles. The Soviet side has stressed its desire to draw up an agreement on this issue in as short a time as possible and has also shown willingness to constructively resolve the question of operational and tactical missiles. But once again the NATO politicians are showing their weakness for the aforementioned dance step. The Soviet Union only had to "unleash" the Reykjavik package for operational and tactical missiles to be cited as the obstacle in the way of reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles. But when the USSR expressed willingness to completely eliminate them within 1 year, the NATO members began disconcertedly elaborating: We have been misinterpreted, they said. As it transpires, they are not so much interested in a reduction on the Soviet side as in an arms upgrading on the U.S. side.

A similar picture has developed in other areas. The Soviet Union has reaffirmed its intention to make a 50 percent reduction in its strategic arms over a period of 5 years and totally eliminate them within 10 years. This, it goes without saying, is on the condition that the ABM Treaty is observed and the arms race not transferred to space. Washington, however, intends to spin out the implementation of this stage to last 7 years instead of 5 years, and it would like to reduce the commitment not to leave the ABM Treaty from 10 years to 7 years.

The secretary of state was told in no uncertain terms that the USSR considers the very idea of SDI to be harmful. If the United States begins deployment of a space-based ABM system there will be no agreement on strategic offensive weapons. At the same time the Soviet Union is trying to unravel this knot. As a compromise solution it is agreeable to laboratory research in the ABM area, by which one would understand work conducted on earth -- in institutes, at test sites, and at plants.

The Soviet side has proposed to the U.S. Administration that work begin on drawing up "key provisions" regarding strategic offensive weapons, ABM Treaty policy, and nuclear tests. They could form the basis of legally binding agreements between the USSR and the United States. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee is prepared to meet with the U.S. President in order to coordinate these "key provisions" and sign a treaty on medium-range missiles.

In the last 2 years the Soviet leadership has gone to a great deal of effort to improve the atmosphere in relations between Moscow and Washington and create new potential for mutual understanding and accords. One can only regret that the U.S. Administration still shows no serious desire to use the chances it has been offered. As we can see, the false belief that the USSR needs detente and disarmament more than the West is still in operation.

New opportunities for a cardinal turnabout in international relations have now appeared. Whether these opportunities will be taken and, if so, how soon, now depends entirely on Washington.

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CSO: 5200/1437

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COMMENTARIES ON GORBACHEV PROPOSALS ON TRIP TO CSSR

Foreign Ministry Spokesman

LD121135 Prague in Slovak to Europe 2230 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] [Announcer] Gennadiy Gerasimov, Soviet Foreign Ministry representative and a member of the entourage of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on his official friendly visit to Czechoslovakia, gave an interview to Radio Prague correspondent, Stefan Babiak.

Asked how he evaluates the importance of the new Soviet initiatives contained in the speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship rally, Gennadiy Gerasimov replied:

[Begin Gerasimov recording in Russian fading into translation] It is a continuation of our policy aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons on the world toward the year 2000. Some obstacles, however, continually come up. We go to compromise, we back down, and in the West they continually keep thinking up new arguments to prevent the way forward to disarmament. Here in Prague Mikhail Gorbachev overturned some arguments. The first comment on his speech was made by your highest representative Gustav Husak. He said that the Soviet statesman swept from the table the arguments of the enemies of disarmament. Among other things we proposed independent talks about a reduction in the number and the elimination of operational and tactical missiles, those missiles of a range of 500-1,000 km. This was also one of the obstacles artificially created on the path to agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. This is a very important proposal, we shall see how the West replies to it.

In any case, today we are proposing to the West that talks be held on operational and tactical missiles in parallel [paralelne] and not to link this question with the problem of the removal of medium-range missiles. If the question of medium-range missiles is solved, then naturally we will remove the operational and tactical missiles with enhanced range that are located on the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR as a counterweight to U.S. Pershings and cruise missiles which the United States brought to Europe.

Another significant initiative concerns the proposal for a meeting of foreign ministers in Vienna to finally solve the question of the calling of a European conference on the reduction of conventional and chemical weapons in Europe. For a number of years now we have been holding talks on this issue. The so-called small Vienna has lasted 13 years now. Talks have been continuing all this time and they still cannot move from the

spot. It is necessary to chase them along a bit. We are prepared to eliminate inequality in arms in the direction of reduction if this inequality exists in some areas. And this is also a very significant initiative.

In his speech Mikhail Gorbachev also spoke about chemical weapons, about the fact that we have stopped their production, that we do not have them in other countries but only on our own territory, and that we have begun the construction of a new enterprise designated for their destruction in case of agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons. These initiatives have Europe in mind above all, because Mikhail Gorbachev was speaking in the center of Europe. He spoke about how to build a peaceful Europe.  
[end recording]

[Announcer] Asked where he sees the significance of the present visit by the highest Soviet representatives for the further development of relations between both our countries, Gennadiy Gerasimov said:

[Begin Gerasimov recording in Russian fading into translation] I would say that this visit raises our relations to a new level. The main goal, the main purpose of the visit, as Mikhail Gorbachev said, is to secure the development of relations between our countries and raising them onto a qualitatively higher plane. I think that this will be expounded in detail in the joint document that will be adopted. [end recording]

[Announcer] Asked how he evaluated the importance of the proposals by the Governments of Czechoslovakia and the GDR addressed to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, on the creation of a nuclear and chemical weapon-free corridor in central Europe, Gennadiy Gerasimov replied:

[Begin Gerasimov recording in Russian fading into translation] The Soviet Union fully supports this initiative. To a certain extent it overlaps with our proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe as a whole. For example in that initiative we proposed talks on operational and tactical missiles and some of them are exactly in this corridor. We are prepared to eliminate them completely, but if there is no success in doing this quickly, then, in the case of the corridor being created, we are prepared to take them away [odvest]. This is a very interesting idea because here there should be no nuclear weapons; that means not even weapons of dual designation. Now there are guns that can fire both nuclear and ordinary ammunition. We are of the opinion that such weapons of dual designation must also be removed from the nuclear-free corridor. Unfortunately Bonn's reaction is very reserved, almost negative. The idea of creating a nuclear-free corridor is however very good, and the Soviet Union fully supports it. [end recording]

#### Weekly Review 12 April

PM150903 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[Nikolay Kurdyumov "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Unbreakable Alliance

The official friendly visit of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Czechoslovakia at the invitation of the CPCZ Central Committee was the major international event of these days.

## Real Way [subhead]

During the Soviet leader's stay on Czech and Slovak soil great attention was devoted to the development of the international situation. And this is natural. Mankind is living through a complex and crucial period. The realities of the nuclear missile age unequivocally attest that never before has our common home been subjected to such danger as now. If you take as the base unit, for example, the total might of all the explosives expended in World War II, the nuclear weapons now stockpiled would suffice for 6,000 such world wars. Meanwhile the arms race is continuing, and the danger of its shift into space is increasing. It is a still more alarming fact that these weapons are continuously being improved and that increasingly monstrous and refined "exotic" kinds of them are being created [sozdat], like the "nuclear pumping" means for laser devices of the SDI system.

The Soviet Union proposes a truly peaceful alternative to the running of military conveyor belts and the increasing danger of war. Hence the very wide recognition given in people's hearts everywhere to the Soviet program for a nuclear-free world and the program for security through disarmament, which has opened up a real way to free a world oversaturated with weapons from its deadly burden and to save mankind from the threat of self-destruction.

For the Soviet Union the elimination of nuclear weapons is a natural and law-governed stage on the way to building not just a nuclear-free but also a truly nonviolent world which presupposes equitable relations and respect for every people's interests and for their right to make their own choice. The Soviet leadership demonstrates by specific actions its determination and readiness to act and indefatigably to seek solutions which open up the way to mutually acceptable accords on the cardinal problems of ensuring security for all.

Convincing confirmation of this is provided by the USSR's decision to single out from the package of questions the problem of the total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe and to conclude a separate agreement on this without delay. The positive response to the Soviet initiative from broad circles in many countries on the European continent attests to the peoples' interest in removing dangerous weapons. Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Finland, and many other European countries have come out in favor of solving the problem of Euromissiles. A real opportunity has emerged to remove an entire class of nuclear weapons from European soil and to begin the process of eliminating them. However, the Soviet Union had only to suggest realizing this opportunity, and NATO militarist circles, which only yesterday seemed to be campaigning for the implementation of the "zero option" on medium-range missiles, were seized with fear. While not venturing to go back openly on their word, certain Western politicians have begun seeking all kinds of pretexts for wrecking the agreement. Like a snowball, the question of medium-range missiles has begun to acquire all kinds of provisos, conditions, and linkages.

Thus, people in the West have recently been saying a great deal about the problem of operational and tactical missiles. In order to facilitate the urgent conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union expresses readiness to resolve this problem constructively too, without linking it to the course and outcome of solving the problem of medium-range missiles. To this end the USSR proposes beginning a discussion of the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km stationed on the European Continent. For the duration of the talks the sides would adopt pledges not to increase the number of such missiles.

In order to exclude the possibility of a sudden attack there is an urgent need to take measures to reduce and ultimately eliminate tactical nuclear weapons and to radically reduce armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. The Soviet Union believes that the realization of the Warsaw Pact countries' Budapest program, which proposes that questions of reducing armed forces and conventional arms be resolved in a package with tactical missiles, attack aircraft, nuclear artillery, and other tactical nuclear means, would be a major step in this direction.

Measures such as the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones free from chemical weapons could also serve well to reduce military confrontation in Europe and strengthen security on the continent. In particular, the Soviet Union supports the GDR and CSSR Governments' recent appeal to the FRG Government proposing the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe and is ready to guarantee and respect the nuclear-free status of such a zone.

Advocating the urgent solution of the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union is convinced that such a first and truly great step in the disarmament sphere would not only be of great military and political significance but would also help to create a fundamentally new climate of East-West mutual understanding and to assert on the continent and throughout the world an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and trust, of coexistence and cooperation.

#### For Space Without Weapons [subhead]

Some 26 years ago, 12 April 1961, an astounded and rapt world applauded an unforgettable event in the history of human civilization. The daring dream of science fiction writers and scientists of putting a man into a new sphere -- space -- came true. The name of the space pioneer who orbited the earth spread throughout the world -- Yuriy Gagarin, in whose memory our planet's grateful inhabitants annually celebrate 12 April as World Aerospace Day.

Right from the start of the space age the Soviet Union proceeded and still proceeds from the premise that space is the property of all mankind and man's activity there must be placed at the service of peace and progress. On the day of the first cosmonaut's flight our country solemnly declared that it was joyfully placing its victories in space exploration at the service of all peoples in the name of the good and the happiness of all people on earth.

More than a quarter-century has elapsed since then. These years have clearly shown that space exploration opens up truly tremendous prospects for the scientific and national economic activity of earth people. And many peaceful avenues have been determined for rendering space habitable and investigating it. Today everyone knows the practical results of work in space for people's needs. People already make extensive use of space communications services and navigation and meteorological satellites, geologists prospect for minerals with the help of space photographs, and so forth. [paragraph continues]

The time is not far off when industrial shops will be operating in orbit. In short, the benefits which space exploration is already giving and can give to earthly civilization are tremendous. But admiration for the horizons of human reason which have been opened up is also mixed with a sense of bitterness and apprehension. For it has recently been becoming increasingly obvious that space can also be used to harm man and can become a source of deadly danger to people's lives.

The Soviet Union strives resolutely to prevent such madness. Reflecting the vital interests and aspirations of the world community, it consistently advocates the creation of international legal barriers in the way of turning space into a military bridgehead and advocates that states' activities in space not serve to kindle enmity but act as a bridge to strengthen trust and mutual understanding among them on earth. This is confirmed by the initiative advanced by the USSR within the UN framework, which provides for the implementation of a three-stage program of states' joint practical actions to investigate and utilize space for peaceful purposes and the establishment of a World Space Organization. Space research under the "Intercosmos" program, the implementation of the major international "Venus-Halley's Comet" project, and the joint Soviet-U.S. "Soyuz-Apollo" space experiment have been vivid examples of such fruitful cooperation among scientists and specialists of various countries.

The plans being nurtured on the other side of the ocean to spread the arms race into space and turn it into a "Star Wars" theater appear particularly sinister against the background of the Soviet program for cooperation in the peaceful investigation and use of space. Ignoring the opinions and warnings of many authoritative specialists that the creation [sozdaniye] of space ABM systems within the SDI framework would increase immeasurably the risk of a thermonuclear catastrophe, U.S. Administration figures endlessly repeat, like an incantation, their "unshakable allegiance" to SDI. And not only do they repeat this but they also work with feverish haste to realize their schemes in the illusory hope of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and the world of socialism. On the basis of an interview with scientists working on ABM problems THE NEW YORK TIMES pointed out recently that "the Pentagon is secretly preparing a detailed plan to station an ABM system in space by the mid-nineties." According to press reports, the U.S. military department is also planning to lay its hands on an orbital space station, the project for whose creation [sozdaniye] was recently approved by the president in order with its help to "usher in a new era of military operations in space." The weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT explains in this connection: In the current fiscal year the Pentagon budget for operations in space totals approximately 17 billion dollars and is more than double the NASA budget.

In the light of the feverish work being done under the SDI program in the United States it is understandable and natural that at the recent New York session of the legal subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space delegates from many countries of the world community described the American plans for "Star Wars" as a threat to all human civilization. The Indian newspaper PATRIOT writes that throughout the world, including in the United States, there is a growing movement against the dangerous plans to transfer the arms race into space. And the Soviet Union's active peace-loving foreign policy course and its constructive initiatives aimed at creating a nuclear-free world are helping these sentiments to grow, the newspaper points out.



## Prague TV Roundtable

LD130820 Prague Television Service in Czech 1630 GMT 12 Apr 87

[Roundtable program presented by Dr Jan Zelenka, director general of Czechoslovak Television, with Academician Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of Economy of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Soviet participants speaking in Russian with superimposed Czech translation]

[Excerpts] [Zelenka] Good evening, esteemed television viewers. I welcome you at our roundtable discussion to which we have invited important Soviet representatives of sciences and publicity, if I can term it in this way, whom you already know very well from your television screens. I shall introduce them to you alphabetically. In the first place, there is Comrade Oleg Bogomolov, an academician and director of the Institute of Economy of the World Socialist System of the Academy of Sciences, then there is Comrade Gennadiy Gerasimov, the head of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom you know from the regular weekly news conferences, which our correspondent reports from Moscow, and finally Academician Comrade Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences.

We have thus introduced ourselves and the viewers now know you well and, as I have said, some of you from previous occasions. What is to be the subject of our discussion? Perhaps naturally we shall return to what we have been experiencing along with Comrade Gorbachev during his outstanding visit in Czechoslovakia and his speeches and talks with our general secretary, Comrade Husak. Both the communique and all the talks show that our approach both to domestic and international affairs is a common and united one. We are striving to bring about an all-around deepening and perfecting of Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation and, quite simply, to make all our cooperation more dynamic. During the past few years the well-known words glasnost and perestroyka have entered our political vocabulary. Now, for instance, in Comrade Gorbachev's speeches -- both when dealing with the issues of domestic and foreign policy -- the term new thinking has appeared. Could we ponder what this new thinking is, what the new thinking requires both in foreign and domestic policy?

[Gerasimov] The world has changed a great deal. It was Einstein who called for new thinking because the world had changed. Where foreign policy is concerned, the main change lies in the fact that we are living in an atomic age when we cannot defend ourselves against the nuclear threat by our own technical means and therefore we now have to seek security for every country by other means. Regrettably, there still exists the view, as it used to be said in Roman times, that whoever wants peace must prepare for war. Mrs Thatcher recently visited Moscow and she holds this position. This Roman position has served to cover up preparations for numerous wars. Now, if we prepare ourselves for a war, we shall raise the level of nuclear confrontation and this threatens us with the total suicide of all mankind, either because of a technical accident, or through a mistaken calculation, or as a result of political adventurism, and for this reason we now must tackle the issues of war and peace in a new way. This involves the search for joint security and for political means to tackle complex international issues.

[Primakov] I would like to voice my disagreement straightaway with the proposition that it was Einstein who was the first to say so, and that we have to begin with him. Perhaps he said so, but he lived in a different age.

The fact is that in the 1950's and also the 1960's we used to say if an aggressor should attack us, he would be destroyed in the flames of war -- the strike in response. Yes. But unfortunately, now we cannot say this. We have never attacked anybody, but if there should now be an attack on socialist countries, if there should be a thermonuclear war -- that would lead to the liquidation of all human civilization. Such a situation arose for the first time in 1950 -- in Einstein's time this was not the case.

[Gerasimov] In 1955, Einstein did forecast this.

[Primakov] Well, all right, but I think that we do not have to count this forecast from Einstein.

Now -- how to look at the new political thinking. It has already been said by Gennadiy Ivanovich that these are new approaches toward security. First of all you noted that security has to be ensured above all by political means -- this first of all -- but there are other approaches, too, to the military section. Security must now be ensured. Looking at this from the military aspect, there has to be sufficient safeguarding of this security. It is not possible to increase the present strategic level existing between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, between the Soviet Union and the United States; it is not possible to continue the trend that has emerged; it is not possible to increase this level...

[Gerasimov, interrupting] because this level then will not be able to ensure security by itself.

[Primakov] Yes, the question of nuclear deterrence: To deter someone we need a somewhat higher level, and thus we want this level to preserve the security of both sides. However, we want this level to be reduced to the lowest possible level. Thus we want to remove the nuclear element; if we manage this the level will be reduced considerably.

[Zelenka] The great risk of any kind of clumsiness or a mistake that could lead to war would be reduced.

[Primakov] Yes, of course. Here is yet another parameter by which we can measure the new approaches. Security cannot be ensured by security of one side only; equal security for the other side is necessary, too.

[Bogomolov] I would like to stress another feature of the new thinking. Previously we reasoned: the worse for the adversary, the better for us, and vice versa. But today this is no longer true; this cannot be a rule anymore. Now countries are so dependent on each other for their development that we have to have quite a different image of the solution to international questions. The worsening of the situation in Europe will not at all help the development of the socialist part of Europe; on the contrary, the better things are going in the European and world economy, the higher the stability and the better the prospects for our development.

[Zelenka] Concerning the answer to the various questions being asked in the West at the moment -- which is more advantageous for us, a weak Soviet Union or a strong Soviet Union? Such questions were asked. You are, in fact, answering such questions. On the whole, stable states mean a certain stability of life.

[Gerasimov] There exists, I would say, a kind of watershed. What kind of Soviet Union is better for the West -- the weak, that is, without restructuring; or strong, that is, with restructuring? The most sensitive Western politicians are answering in a positive way. I criticized Mrs Thatcher who is in favor of nuclear weapons. Margaret Thatcher is of the opinion that restructuring, from the point of view of the overall situation, is a good thing; whereas in Washington many politicians do not think so. They think, on the contrary, that when the USSR is stronger, it will be worse for them. So various views exist in the West.

[Primakov] I would like to return to your question -- namely, the question of new political thinking. One of the elements of new political thinking is flexibility in the approach to tackling the main question: halting the arms race. It is not by chance that this has resounded in the address of Comrade Gorbachev here two days ago. It is not by chance that Comrade Gorbachev tried to find in Prague some kind of a solution to that ripe question. This concerns medium-range missiles. It is not by chance that he did it here in Prague, here, in the heart of Europe -- and he said so in his address.

[Bogomolov] The art of achieving compromise has always been one of the significant qualities of diplomacy and international politics. There are new things present in this respect, but, at the same time, it is also traditional.

[Primakov] All the traditions have not always been used unequivocally. I think that now this tradition is being used much more widely than before. For example, the question of medium-range missiles. What did they tell us when Gorbachev delivered the statement that we are willing -- or that we propose -- to do away with these missiles in Europe? They replied right away in the West that we must tie this with operational and tactical missiles.

[Gerasimov] Well, not directly right away, but 1 or 2 days later.

[Zelenka] Only after thinking about it well; they stopped all of a sudden.

[Primakov] Then the next argument is that it also must be tied to the limitation of conventional weapons -- as if they did not even notice that we did link it together, for it was said in the same statement in which we propose to do away with missiles in Europe -- that is, medium-range missiles -- that we also are willing to withdraw immediately operational and tactical increased-range missiles from the territories of Czechoslovakia and GDR, and to start talks -- as we put it at that time -- concerning operational and tactical missiles. Moreover, they waged a campaign against us as if their zero option did not even exist, when in fact we took their zero option as a point of departure. They presented it themselves, and when we accepted it, all of a sudden they started talking about something else and made it contingent on other things.

[Gerasimov] There is a Stanley Kubrick film -- Dr Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and to Love the Bomb. So now that we have accepted the zero option, they have stopped worrying all of a sudden. Now they talk about nuclear deterrence again. They talk about conventional weapons.

[Primakov] But we are willing to limit such weapons as well. Comrade Gorbachev tried to solve these questions, or, as Comrade Husak said, he literally swept off the table all that the Western powers accumulated. He said the following, above all: We are willing independently from the medium-range missiles to start talks about strategic and tactical [as heard; Russian heard to say "operational"] missiles and to freeze their number for the time of the talks.

[Bogomolov] Recently, the attempt to achieve some kind of solution to this question and the willingness for a compromise is shown by our side and this is a new feature in the foreign political activity of the Soviet Union and socialist countries, but the West continues to stick to its policy of profits.

[Gerasimov] For example, the question of verification [kontrol] -- they always have said that we would never agree to verification. Always when the reduction of the level of armament, disarmament was discussed they used to say: You don't want to agree on verification. Now when we agree to verification, and even with on-site inspection, they suddenly are beginning to back away from this and say: What would it be like if Soviet inspectors should appear at U.S. bases? and so on.

[Primakov] Despite this, I think that we can remain optimistic. Comrade Gorbachev has only just said that hope can exist.

[Bogomolov, interrupting] And optimism is also a feature of the new political thinking.

[Primakov] Yes, we cannot be pesimistic.

[Gerasimov] Optimism is practical, because if a person believes in something and wants something, then he also fights for it. But if we fold our arms and remain pesimistic then we shall achieve nothing.

[Primakov] We must, of course, be optimistic. Public opinion is changing. In the West, for example, they are having far greater difficulties with the preservation of those stereotypes created by hostile propaganda toward our country, Czechoslovakia, and other socialist countries. This is very difficult.

[Zelenka] Now, comrades, I would like to progress to the concluding points of our debate. Comrade Gorbachev in his address in Prague said vary vehemently that it would be a triumph of the new way of thinking if one could realize what he calls a pan-European house. What should such a pan-European house contain?

[Gerasimov] Many people thought about this pan-European house, even Jiri from Podebrady, for example, who wrote an entire treatise. Everything looked wonderful on paper: All kings must stop waging war. There were also other suggestions -- I think mention Kant in this respect, and others. But at that time there were no realistic possibilities for such things. Now that we are returning, so to speak, to what we have started with respect to new thinking, we have a joint base, a joint geographical position, joint cultural traditions. But Europe is divided into two camps. That is very dangerous. We must respect Europe and our joint home and see to it that it does not collapse.

[Zelenka] I would like to repeat again that in Europe, where joint culture and joint civilization were born, there are now the biggest numbers of troops and armies, nuclear warheads, there is now the greatest degree of danger in the world.

[Primakov] As you know, at the 27th party congress new stress was laid on the world's mutual conditioning and interdependence. We are dialecticians; we understand that the world is developing as a consequence of unity and the struggle of opposites, up to a certain point. We kept forgetting about the first process -- unity. We kept talking about the struggle of opposites only. Naturally, this struggle exists, naturally, socialism and capitalism exist in Europe and outside Europe. At the same time, there is that unity, too. We have seen this unity.

[Zelenka] It has to be used for the sake of the position of Europe.

[Primakov] Yes, of course.

[Gerasimov] There is negative unity and there is positive unity. In nearly every European city there is a plague column -- here is unity for you, it was a common danger: the plague. Even now we have a common danger: the nuclear danger.

[Bogomolov] Then one also has pollution.

[Zelenka] That is a danger that is common for all of Europe today.

[Primakov] But you are starting from the negative.

[Gerasimov] We have also mentioned the positive things.

[Primakov] There is the world economy, which is developing according to its own laws.

[Zelenka] Never before has there been such communication and such interdependence of individual countries in Europe as now.

[Primakov] Europe is divided into two communities of integration. However, there are certain uniform laws and we are now taking much notice of them, not only because mutual dependence in the world is increasing, but also because Europe, as Comrade Gorbachev stressed, can play a very important, positive role. Thus, a united Europe, when we view it as one whole unit, can have a very stabilizing influence on the whole international community.

[Zelenka] I would like now to come to a full stop after the new thinking. I thank you very much, friends, for the participation in this discussion. Once more, we are saying good-bye to Academician Bogomolov, Academician Primakov, and our dear guest Gennadiy Gerasimov. Greetings to you, our esteemed and dear viewers, once more, and see you another time!

#### Husak Comments

PM150843 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent S. Vtorushin dispatch under general heading: "For a Happy Future; International Public on New Soviet Peace Initiatives"]

[Excerpts] Prague, 13 Apr--Czechoslovakia is under the impression of M.S. Gorbachev's visit.

Everyone you meet these days says: The CPSU's innovatory course and the revolutionary restructuring under way in the USSR instill optimism and the firm belief that socialism will scale new heights. This is gladdening and gives hope for the normalization of the international situation and the possibility of a nuclear-free world.

Today RUDE PRAVO and other Czechoslovak newspapers published an interview with G. Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and president of the CSSR, devoted to the results of M.S. Gorbachev's visit.

I think that not only I myself but also all our citizens are very satisfied with the results of the visit, the Czechoslovak leader said. It is important that our mutual relations were assessed by both sides as being very good. We paid special attention to the development of economic and scientific-technical cooperation and the use of new forms of this cooperation, such as the development of direct links between enterprises and the creation of joint organizations and the intensification of specialization and sharing, which helps both countries.

I consider the new peace-loving proposals put forward by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary at the meeting in Prague to be very important. As is well known, the Soviet Union has come out with numerous peace-loving proposals concerning nuclear and other armaments. But the Western countries are constantly putting forward various objections, either regarding verification or the fact that questions of short-range nuclear missiles, conventional armaments, and so forth have not been resolved yet. In this comprehensive new proposal, M.S. Gorbachev gave a clear, constructive, and unequivocal answer. Now nothing should stand in the way of further talks. All the more so since these proposals have met with a positive response in Western countries.

The talks in Prague and Bratislava showed that both parties consider the main task of their international policy to be the consolidation of the peoples' security and the conservation of peace on our planet.

In this regard, the Czechoslovak newspapers highlight in particular the package of proposals made by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for the consolidation of Europe's security and trust between the continent's states. They note the Soviet Union's full support for the appeal of the GDR and CSSR Governments to the FRG Government proposing the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe and the USSR's readiness to withdraw all Soviet nuclear weapons from the corridor.

The CPSU Central Committee general secretary's visit to Czechoslovakia has become a major event of international life.

#### CPCZ Presidium Report

LD150958 Moscow TASS in English 0832 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Prague, 15 Apr (TASS)--The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPC] has considered the course and results of Mikhail Gorbachev's official friendly visit to Czechoslovakia on April 9-11, 1987.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and all Czechoslovak people highly assessed the CPSU's foreign policy directed at improving the international situation, abolishing nuclear and other types of weapons of mass annihilation and ensuring security in Europe and all over the world, and fully backed this policy, the report said.

They welcomed Gorbachev's new major proposals put forward in Prague, proposals that refuted the West's objections and paved the way for reaching agreements leading to a nuclear-free Europe.

These and other initiatives confirmed the USSR's constructive and responsible attitude to establishing an atmosphere of mutual confidence and a firm foundation for our common "European home," the Presidium of the CPC Central Committee said.

#### Primakov Comments

AU152041 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 14 Apr 87 p 6

[Interview with Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by Rudolf Nittmann in Bratislava on 11 April: "Profound Interest in Building Our Pan-European House; Academician Yevgeniy Primakov on Mikhail Gorbachev's Prague Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] [Nittmann] In his Prague speech Comrade Gorbachev placed special emphasis on the fact that the solution of a whole set of problems concerning nuclear disarmament constitutes the foundation of a joint European house. Reykjavik and the Soviet proposal for the elimination of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe already showed that chances for this exist. What sort of further course of action does the Soviet Union propose now?

[Primakov] Comrade Gorbachev underscored in Prague a number of issues that are closely connected with the disentanglement of many problems entangled by the United States. Comrade Gorbachev voiced the hope that they can be extricated. This optimism is founded on two factors. The first factor is the steadily growing realization that the continuation of previous trends in the international situation could result in a universal catastrophe. In this connection he stressed that realism is evidently on the rise in the West, albeit it has not yet reached great dimensions. This is a long road and it would be premature to claim that realism and a new approach to international issues have already prevailed there, that new political thinking has already gained ground. Nonetheless, certain sprouts of this are there. The second factor, which he mentioned in his speech, is Reykjavik. Reykjavik not only showed that it was the United States that blocked new opportunities for a breakthrough in the sphere of disarmament, it also marked -- in defiance of this fact -- a new stage, a new era because the positions on a number of issues were reasonably constructive and a new philosophy was set forth, a philosophy that could open the road to advancement.

The Soviet Union recently announced that it is ready to open up the package of its proposals and to take out of it the question of intermediate-range missiles. Why did the Soviet Union do this? We always speak about two types of linkage. One type is the strategic or objective linkage, the linkage, for example, between offensive weapons and the so-called SDI of the United States. This is an objective linkage because the creation of the SDI system would preclude any reduction in offensive missiles and their number would increase. The second type of linkage is a negotiating linkage [rokovacia

zviazanost]. Because the Soviet Union made great concessions, we tied everything into a single package. We expected the other side to make great concessions as well. Regrettably, this has not happened. That is why this part, which was linked with negotiations, could be excluded from the package. Our motives for doing so were twofold. First, the United States had blocked any other progress and it was necessary to seek new ways of conducting a dialogue. Second, we ascribe great importance to delivering Europe from nuclear missiles, particularly those of intermediate range. A number of states came up with this request in negotiations and eminent personalities at the Moscow forum also turned to us in this matter. The USSR decided to unwrap the package. But as soon as we did this, the West suddenly started to slow down the implementation of agreements on intermediate-range missiles, although, in the event of an agreement, we would for all practical purposes accept the U.S. zero option.

[Nittmann] As is known, the United States is now renouncing its zero option.

[Primakov] Well-known journalist Flora Lewis poked fun at this when she said that the Americans do not want to negotiate even with themselves. The main argument they used in this connection was that we supposedly have a certain superiority in operational and tactical missiles and that, supposedly, it is impossible to deal with the question of intermediate-range missiles without resolving that issue as well. When they speak about the linkage of these two issues, they betray their own speculation as they are knocking on an open door. The USSR has said many times that it is ready to link these two questions: When we proposed the destruction of all intermediate-range missiles in Europe, we immediately said that at one and the same time we will also remove increased-range operational and tactical missiles from the territories of Czechoslovakia and the GDR and we were ready to start immediate negotiations on this issue, but this time we have gone even further. Comrade Gorbachev declared in Prague that we are ready to conduct these negotiations /in parallel/ [slantlines denote widening as published], concurrently, regardless of what will happen with intermediate-range missiles. We proposed that these talks start without delay, with the aim of not only reducing the number of these missiles, but of liquidating them altogether. This means that we are proposing a zero solution also for operational and tactical missiles. At the same time, the increased range missiles are not being linked with these talks. We will remove them at the same time, once we sign an agreement of intermediate-range missiles.

Comrade Gorbachev declared, furthermore, that we are ready to accept any forms of verification. However, our verification philosophy is such that we are prepared to accept any forms of verification in the event of the signing of an agreement. That means that we are opposed to verification for the sake of verification, to espionage under the guise of verification. If nothing is signed, what, in fact, is there to verify?

I would like to stress yet one more thing from Comrade Gorbachev's speech. He stressed that we are ready to reduce offensive strategic missiles by 50 percent within 5 years or, if they want, to abolish all nuclear missiles within 10 years. We have facilitated the attainment of this goal, but only under the condition that the sides will definitely not infringe upon the ABM Treaty. These are new accents in our proposals. The first reactions from the West have been positive, not to mention the chemical weapons. [sentence as published] Comrade Gorbachev said that we have halted the production of chemical weapons and that we have started to build a plant for the destruction of the stocks of these weapons. Furthermore, he said that we are ready to conduct wide-ranging talks on the limitation of conventional arms and that we are ready to hold a consultative meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs in Vienna in order to open the road to such wide-ranging talks. Reagan has now even been compelled to say that he acknowledges the Soviet step as a step forward on the road to the implementation of a possible agreement on intermediate-range missiles.



[Nittmann] This is what he said officially. But what excuses will his Secretary of State Shultz bring with him to Moscow?

[Primakov] Well, we shall see. Some circumstances again give cause for concern. They have started to talk about espionage matters again, and that is not a prelude to talks. The United States always undertakes such campaigns when important talks are on the agenda. Before Geneva, it was the Weinberger letter, and before Reykjavik, the Daniloff case. They always do such things when important matters are at stake.

[Nittmann] In his speech in Prague Comrade Gorbachev said that now there is a unique chance to start the process of nuclear disarmament, which must not be wasted. Wherein lies this chance, in your opinion?

[Primakov] Indeed, it is necessary to seize the opportunity being created by our formidable concessions. If an agreement were reached on intermediate-range missiles, this would be the first time in history that existing missiles are actually physically destroyed. It would be the beginning of a whole process of nuclear disarmament. Until now, various ceilings have always been defined, and these ceiling had to be reached, with the result that more such weapons have thus actually been produced. There is yet another aspect: The West assumes that we have a larger number of operational and tactical missiles and that, consequently, they must reach what they say is our level. Comrade Gorbachev spoke about a different approach: He who has a preponderance must cut his numbers, instead of the other side increasing theirs.

[Nittmann] Comrade Gorbachev also emphasized in his speech new approaches to building our joint European home. This, too, is an idea that is winning the sympathy of all Europeans.

[Primakov] You are right. As early as at the 27th CPSU Congress Comrade Gorbachev spoke about the growing mutual dependence of the whole world. This also applies to Europe. Of course, no one denies, nor can he deny, that Europe is divided, that it houses capitalist and socialist states. However, the dialectics are such that, despite this division, it remains an organic whole. It has its own history, its own culture, its own civilization, of which we are all a part. In the opinion of Comrade Gorbachev, Europe could contribute in a very positive way to stabilizing the situation on a global scale.

[Nittmann] Individual states as well as their governments can do a great deal for this. Comrade Gorbachev specifically mentioned Paris, London, and Bonn's share in clearing Europe of intermediate-range missiles, but actions by the European public can also do a great deal in this respect. What do you think of such campaigns and what can be done by the public of our countries?

[Primakov] Well, what matters is a truly active contribution. Our people and the working people of other socialist countries can do a great deal to enhance the attractiveness of socialism. The fact that we are now carrying out restructuring and democratization in all respects not only strengthens us, but strengthens socialism as a whole. The model of socialism that we are creating demonstrates to everyone that it is an attractive model, a model that has unequalled advantages over capitalism. In this way we are strengthening socialism on a global scale.

[Nittmann] Socialism thus also effectively helps to build our joint European home. How would you assess the efforts of the West European public in this joint construction?

[Primakov] The international forum for survival in Moscow showed a great deal in this respect. I participated in organizing the "roundtable" for political scientists, which was attended by people of diverse political opinions and convictions. But even though these people voiced diverse views in a free discussion, they all agreed that a way must be found to lead mankind out of the zone of the nuclear threat. This is a good model of what the public can do. It is necessary to abandon the old notion that the only movement that supports us is a peace movement. It is necessary to conduct a dialogue with everyone and to use the potentials of all these people. I believe that we must reinforce our contacts with pacifist organizations, all the more so as this is the time when public opinion is turning its face toward us. And we must seize this opportunity.

#### Speech Circulated at CD

LD141816 Moscow TASS in English 1400 GMT 14 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva April 14 TASS -- A text of the foreign policy part of the speech made by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on April 10 in Prague was circulated here at the disarmament conference as an official document.

Speaking at a plenary meeting, Yuriy Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation, emphasized that the Soviet leader had clearly set forth the stand of the USSR on a number of most topical problems connected with the limitation of the arms race, the consolidation of trust and the development of cooperation. New proposals were made, including on problems that are included in the agenda of the disarmament conference.

The Soviet representative dwelt on the problem of verification and control over the observance of future disarmament agreements. In this field the USSR is ready to advance as much as it is needed. Its concept of arms control covers the whole range of armaments and armed forces. It is a necessary component part of effective agreements if the point at issue is a real limitation, reduction and elimination of the armaments, the armed forces or military activities.

Gheorghe Dolgu, a representative of Romania, welcomed the recent Soviet initiatives on intermediate-range and theatre missiles in Europe. He said that the Soviet proposals created a real possibility of reaching agreement with the U.S. in a short period of time on the settlement of this problem. The Romanian representative pointed out as well the urgent need for a complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which would meet the security interests of all the countries and peoples. He said that the attaining of this goal by the year 2000 was by no means an utopia.

## Western Reaction Viewed

PM150925 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA Press Service report: "Moscow Is Offering an Olive Branch. Evasive and Ambiguous Response by Official Circles in the West"]

[Text] Only 3 days after the Soviet leader's Prague statement, having recovered from their "serious embarrassment," as Britain's THE OBSERVER put it, official circles in the West basically repeated their former response to all recent initiatives by the USSR. Every time Moscow has suggested compromise and mutually acceptable solutions in the arms control sphere, displayed exceptional flexibility at talks, and demonstrated in practice the meaning of "new thinking" in the nuclear age, the Western partners responded with the formula "Yes, of course, but...."

No exception was made as regards the USSR's proposal to start discussing the question of the reduction and subsequent elimination of missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km, without linking with it the course and outcome of solving the problem of medium-range missiles.

U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger declared that this step "sweeps away a major obstacle" from the path to arms reductions, but he went on to add that the United States intends to be "circumspect" and "not to raise any excessive expectations among the public." An even more definite statement was made by a high-ranking U.S. spokesman who did not give his name but did, according to a UPI report, describe the USSR's proposal as "bait." He also said: "We must wait and see what they have in mind."

U.S. Ambassador to the FRG R. Burt warned the West against supporting the Soviet proposals made in Prague because the disappearance of nuclear weapons from the continent of Europe could, he claimed, result in the West "becoming hostage to the USSR's superior conventional arms." It seems as if the champions of strongarm policies and the arms race are fighting stubborn rearguard actions, even though they are surrendering one position after another and losing the arguments in favor of peace based on strength.

Indeed, there are fewer and fewer arguments to be found. Interviewed by the TF-1 channel, French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raimond welcomed M.S. Gorbachev's proposals in the chemical weapons sphere and made a positive assessment of the ideas in the sphere of verification and inspection of the observance of disarmament agreements. At the same time, he emphasized: Of course, the new proposals, like the other Soviet initiatives, do contain positive elements, but everything must be thoroughly weighed and considered before a final assessment is made. I repeat that it is necessary to show "double vigilance" as regards the Soviet Union's policy, the minister declared.

The thesis of "double vigilance" is currently being promoted in various ways in London and Bonn. Despite the "loudly expressed fears" about Soviet operational and tactical missiles, Britain's THE OBSERVER writes, neither M. Thatcher nor H. Kohl "want these systems eliminated. They want the right to match the Soviet forces on the basis of the 'missile for missile' principle within the framework of a ceiling that would result from accords."

In other words, while the Soviet Union proposes to take matters as far as the reduction and subsequent elimination of missiles of this class, London and Bonn -- to judge by THE OBSERVER's commentary -- seek to build up operational and tactical missiles. If this is so, the approaches are diametrically opposed.

It is no accident that champions of military detente in Europe have warned the Western countries' governments not to reject the Soviet initiative outright. For example, H.-J. Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] Bundestag faction, condemned the maneuvers by right-wing forces creating obstacles to the implementation of this proposal. The Social Democrats, he said, will not allow the "zero option" on these missiles to be torpedoed by making it subject to unrealistic conditions. Such attempts, H.-J. Vogel noted, run contrary to the FRG's interests.

The unconstructive position taken by the ruling Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union bloc is a front for the interests of the senior transatlantic partner in NATO. According to E. Horn, SPD expert on defense questions, there are plans to replace the Lance operational and tactical missiles on FRG territory with upgraded missiles of the same class. In its 13 April issue DER SPIEGEL reports a "secret document" from the Ministry of Defense which speaks of plans to replace the reduced range [ponizhennoy dalnosti] Pershing-1A missiles deployed by the Pentagon on FRG territory with the upgraded Pershing-1B model, starting in 1991. Is this not the basic reason for the unwillingness to altogether abandon the "nuclear deterrence" strategy?

And one more commentary. West Germany's NEUE RUHRZEITUNG, summing up the result of the West's response to the Soviet leader's statement, writes: From the general political viewpoint, he has again won the battle for West Europeans' hearts.... In any case, one thing is reprehensible: To dismiss M.S. Gorbachev's new proposals as mere propaganda.

Will this be heeded in Western capitals?

#### 'Excuses' To Avoid Agreement

PM161545 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 87 (edition unknown) p 3

[L. Savanin commentary: "From the Atlantic to the Urals"]

[Text] The speech by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the Prague Palace of Culture is at the focus of the world public's attention. The new proposals by the Soviet leadership "are a real revolution in the disarmament sphere," the French newspaper LES ECHOS observes. The London newspaper THE TIMES quotes Lord Carrington, NATO general secretary, as describing the Soviet proposal to conclude a convention on eliminating chemical weapons as "splendid." "The Soviet Union is once again displaying flexibility," "Gorbachev has taken another step to speed up the process of reaching accords on medium-range missiles in Europe" -- this has been said on leading U.S. television programs....

The new Soviet initiatives made from the geographical center of our continent symbolize the importance of the European aspect of USSR foreign policy, which is aimed at resolving the problems of universal security. This is understandable. Once relations of good-neighborliness and identical security have been established with all the countries from the Atlantic to the Urals, it will be easier to proceed further and simpler to resolve more global tasks in this connection. That is why it is particularly important to draw attention to the question of what subjects for good-neighborly dialogue in our "common European home" are being proposed today by the socialist countries.

The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Conference held in Budapest on 10-11 June 1986 supported the Soviet Union's program to completely eliminate nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons everywhere by the end of the century.

Clearly, it is simply impossible to solve such an extensive task at a stroke, as they say. It has to be resolved in stages. Why not begin with measures, for example, such as creating nuclear-free zones and zones free of chemical weapons in central Europe? This exact proposal has been made by the GDR and CSSR Governments to the FRG Government.

Imagine if all nuclear ammunition, including nuclear mines, operational and tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, tactical strike aircraft, and also antiaircraft missile complexes capable of using nuclear weapons, were to be removed from a corridor 150 kilometres wide on each side of the border dividing the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. How sharply military confrontation would be reduced! And what a major step could be taken subsequently to totally eliminate these weapons!

The first to respond immediately and constructively to this initiative was the Soviet Union. It stated its readiness to remove all Soviet nuclear means from this corridor and guarantee and respect the nonnuclear status of this zone provided, of course, that the NATO bloc would also remove its nuclear weapons from the corridor proposed by the GDR and the CSSR.

Well, and how has the West responded to this proposal? Paul Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has said, for example: "The process of changing NATO's present nuclear strategy could be facilitated by creating a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe.... This would not only lead to the withdrawal of tactical weapons from the forward positions in which they are stationed but also to an alteration in the structure of conventional armed forces." Quite so. This is exactly what is desired by the socialist countries today, and also by everyone else who has a vital interest in lasting peace on the European Continent.

The reaction of official circles in NATO countries has been different, however. Statements have already been made in the West to the effect that a nuclear-free Europe is unacceptable to the NATO countries.

Interesting natural laws can be observed today in the interrelations between the two world systems: The USSR or any other socialist country only has to make another statement in favor of peace and detente for those people in capitalist countries who hitherto approved of and understood such ideas to immediately come up with various excuses and create additional difficulties in order to avoid discussing the issue. This is exactly what is happening today with the problem of reducing medium-range missiles -- that very same "zero option" for which the West recently voted literally with both hands. Some politicians and even entire governments now refuse to have anything to do with their "zero option" -- as if it were an evil spirit -- and are trying to make the solution to the problem of medium-range missiles conditional upon all manner of provisions and linkages, as the Paris newspaper LE FIGARO did recently, for example. The West Europeans are frightened by the Soviet arsenal of conventional weapons with which the USSR would supposedly intimidate Europe after the "denuclearization" of the continent.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries persistently seek new versions of mutually acceptable accords. For example, in order to facilitate the urgent conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles, the USSR has proposed beginning discussion of the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with a range of between 1,000 km that are stationed on the European Continent, without linking the progress and outcome of the tackling of the medium-range missile problem with this.

Implementation of the Warsaw Pact countries' Budapest program, which proposes resolving the questions of reducing armed forces and conventional arms as part of a complex with tactical missiles, strike aircraft, nuclear artillery, and other nuclear tactical means, would be a major step in this direction.

Implementing the proposals of Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to create a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans would undoubtedly be of great significance in the task of reducing military confrontation. The active stand taken by Poland in the matter of building confidence on the European Continent deserves attention and support. The proposal by the Warsaw Pact states to the NATO countries to announce a mutual moratorium for 1-2 years on increases in military expenditure by the two alliances' states is also a new step in resolving the problem of disarmament....

As we can see, a considerable number of proposals have been made. The Warsaw Pact states are prepared to develop a constructive dialogue to determine the most effective ways and specific measures to restructure international relations in line with the aspirations of all peoples in the context of the realities of the nuclear-space age. The development of such a dialogue is precisely the aim of the socialist countries' new proposals to convene an economic forum in Prague, a conference on scientific and technical cooperation in Bucharest, an ecological forum, and a conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation in Moscow, which would have particular significance in the development of the European process "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

Government circles in the West say that they are carefully studying the new peace initiatives made in Prague. One would hope this process does not take very long. The world is waiting for a specific answer to the question troubling everyone today: Will this year see a turning point away from military confrontation and toward detente, which will be initiated by our European Continent?

#### Moscow Radio Roundtable

LD160821 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Program entitled: "In the Name of a Common Goal," presented by Nikolay Agayants, with Academician Yevgeniy Primakov and political observer Nikolay Shishlin]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Hello, comrades. The main event of the last few days undoubtedly has been and remains the official friendly visit to the CSSR by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, which, let me remind you, took place 9-11 April. They were a truly unforgettable 3 days, which have left an indelible impression on the hearts and minds of millions of Czechs of Slovaks, in the history of our states.

I think that three aspects should be singled out in this multifaceted and vivid event. Since we cannot embrace something without bounds, we'll dwell on those in more detail. What am I thinking of? First and foremost the emotional aspect, that is, the atmosphere of genuine fraternity, friendship, warmth, and cordiality in which the visit took place. Next, issues of the theory and practice of socialist construction, which occupied a significant place in the top-level Soviet-Czechoslovak talks and in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech at a Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship rally at Prague Palace of Culture. Finally, the international political aspect of the event -- the new peaceful initiatives put forward by Comrade Gorbachev in Prague, which have received a great response throughout the world.

[Agayants] One of the most important aspects of Mikhail Sergeyevich's visit to the CSSR was, of course, the formulation of new issues in the field of international relations, more specifically on disarmament problems. After all, a great many new elements were presented in Comrade Gorbachev's speech in Prague.

[Primakov] I will try to list these elements concisely, so to speak. First, Mikhail Sergeyevich said that we were ready to hold parallel negotiations on operational and tactical missiles. The significance of this is undoubtedly enormous, because as soon as the USSR announced that it was ready to go for the zero option in medium-range missiles in Europe, with sharp reductions in our missiles in Asia and of the U.S. ones on U.S. territory -- I am talking about medium-range missiles -- in the West they immediately raised objections, although the option was theirs. But what kind of objections were raised?

That this should be coupled to operational and tactical missiles, in which, they say, the USSR has an advantage, that there should be linkage [preceding word in English], as they say, that the two issues should be linked. It was obvious that they already were knocking at an open door, because in proposing to sharply reduce and to destroy medium-range missiles in Europe, Mikhail Sergeyevich already had spoken of our readiness to withdraw increased-range operational and tactical missiles from the territories of the CSSR and the GDR, and to start immediate negotiations on remaining operational and tactical missiles.

[Agayants] Indeed, Yevgeniy Maksimovich, without doubt that is a very important detail. After all, when the USSR speaks about negotiations on operational and tactical missiles it means the following absolutely clearly defined position -- the elimination of these missiles.

[Primakov] That's right, reduction and elimination. In practice we have proposed a zero level in operational and tactical missiles, toward which we are ready to move in stages, taking into consideration the West's position. In his speech, Mikhail Sergeyevich emphasized that where the sides have advantages, let's lower the level of the advantages and not increase the other side's level. I think that this, in principle, is a new philosophy, and I think that it totally disarms those who would like to stimulate the arms race under the pretext of solving the question. That's one element.

The next element in Mikhail Sergeyevich's speech: They in the West have said in effect that not one question can be solved without solving the question of conventional weapons. Well, on this account every possible kind of speculation is in progress. Incidentally, recently, in its regular publication, the London Institute of Strategic Studies quite plainly wrote about the parity existing between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conventional weapons and conventional armed forces. Even so, speculation continues about us not being ready to resolve the issue.

[Agayants] Everyone knows that the Warsaw Pact put forward in Budapest an appropriate proposal for sharp reductions in conventional weapons. There was no appropriate answer. Now we are saying: All right, we also are deflecting this argument and we are deflecting it forcefully. We are ready to start large-scale negotiations in Vienna at the foreign ministerial level on reducing conventional weapons and to conduct such negotiations openly and with enhanced confidence measures to eliminate the possibility of a sudden attack by one side against the other.

[Primakov] Finally the third element. There was all this speculation in the West about the Soviet Union allegedly wanting either all or nothing in offensive strategic missiles. Even some of our friends were saying: You know, the world is not yet secure and is not yet ready to fully eliminate nuclear weapons. Now Mikhail Sergeyevich has said absolutely clearly: We are still in favor of destroying all nuclear assets in the course of 10 years.

But, at the same time, we are ready to eliminate over a 5-year period 50 percent of nuclear, offensive, and strategic assets on both sides, on the condition that the sides will not abandon the ABM Treaty on antimissile defense.

These were new elements and, incidentally, the first reactions, from Reagan and from others, could not have been other than positive. I am of course convinced that now there probably will be all sorts of backtracking, all sorts of things will be done. But the first reaction could not have been other than positive because now public opinion is on our side.

[Shishlin] There also is an interesting detail in this reaction. It is of course mixed and variegated, but unexpectedly figures on the U.S. political stage, such as U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and his assistant, Richard Perle, joined the ranks of optimists in respect to prospects for negotiations on medium-range missiles. That, of course, is something never seen before...

[Primakov, interrupting] makes you perk up your ears. [laughter]

[Shishlin] ...that's right... in the political practice of the last few years.

But what you have been saying is very interesting, very important. Indeed, in the arguments that we encounter from the U.S. Administration there is an ever-present motif, which could be described as all or nothing. In its essential parameters, in its strategic directions, the U.S. policy does not change, that is, by keeping this SDI element, the Strategic Defense Initiative, they expect to force their way through to military superiority, to place the Soviet Union in, well, let's say, in an uncomfortable position, in a vulnerable position, and in essence to aim into the future -- to involve us in an arms race in such a refined field of competition as arms in space with all the consequences resulting from this for peaceful creative plans, for the stability of the world situation, and so on.

So, I think that everything that we have already said contains within it one more thing, a kind of general, wide, deep background to all those ideas expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich. To my mind, we are taking this discussion, after the Moscow forum of peace-loving forces, which was a very noticeable event, and after the Prague speech, we are, all in all, albeit step by step, taking the discussion on halting the arms race, on reducing the arms race, from the closed confines of diplomats' negotiations and representatives of other departments to a judgment by the world public.

[Primakov] You know, they are very much afraid of it. I had to take part in several news conferences in Prague. A journalist, an American journalist asked me: Why do you, the Soviet Union, announce this publicly? Would it not have been better to give Shultz, who is coming to Moscow, these proposals of yours in advance? I told him that the 2 or 3 days that separated the speech from Shultz were quite sufficient for Shultz to think through whether or not he should enter talks on operational and tactical missiles. I added that I probably thought better of Shultz than did the American journalist who was asking the question, because I considered that he would have sufficient data and sufficient experience to resolve that issue in a couple of days.



[Agayants] Summing up the results of the Soviet-Czechoslovak top-level negotiations, Gustav Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee stated: I considered the new peace-loving initiatives put forward by Comrade Gorbachev at the rally in Prague to be very important. In his new comprehensive proposal, Husak emphasized, Comrade Gorbachev gave a clear, constructive, and unambiguous answer. Nothing should block the path to further negotiations now, especially since the proposals met a positive response in Western countries.

[Primakov] He also said that he had swept off the table all those arguments against, so to speak, that were being put forward in the West.

[Agayants] That's right.

[Primakov] That's quite right.

[Shishlin] But we should warn our listeners that this does not mean that some kind of new reservations will not arise...

[Primakov, interrupting] Unfortunately.

[Shishlin] ...in the West. That's right, unfortunately.

[Primakov] You know, we have paused on a kind of gloomy note, in a sense. Nevertheless, they will continue putting them forward -- that is their policy. They will continue to do so.

But with every statement, with every new initiative we are nearing the final solution. Why? Because, it seems to me, that now we can firmly say, even without any propaganda coating, without attempting to exaggerate something that's positive for us, that public opinion in the West is changing in our favor.

[Agayants] Without doubt.

[Primakov] This is an extremely important factor. After all, at one time we used to say that public opinion does not have such a great position or play such an important part in the adoption of political decisions in the West. I agree with you, Nikolay Vladimirovich; far be it from me to criticize everything that has taken place in the past. But I just want to say that that kind of approach did not leave room for public opinion, which indeed does play an important part; otherwise they would not manipulate it. After all, in the West those who are in power manipulate it, and they do it persistently, spending a great deal of money on it. If it did not play any part, they would not manipulate it. It plays a part and now it is turning in our direction. That is an enormous gain. With every such trip, every speech, we gain in public opinion.

[Agayants] Moreover, I'd like to say, Yevgeniy Maksimovich, that altogether in light of these political events we have witnessed during the last few weeks, especially in connection with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to the CSSR, I think that, all in all, a certain perspective is taking shape and that a very important, fundamental idea is growing -- namely, that from Reykjavik there is no way back; from Reykjavik there is only one way: forward. I think that after Reykjavik we have enriched our position significantly, developed it significantly. Were it a creation of the Soviet Union alone, things wouldn't have been all that good. But the fact that the position of our

socialist friends has been enriched, the fact that, as you put it, a noticeable turnabout is taking place in the public frame of mind. All this, of course, creates a potential for peace, a potential for good will, which also promises inspiring results -- results on the plane of a radical improvement in the European and international situation. I think that on this cheerful note we can conclude our meeting today.

We have reached the end of our program. Thank you, Comrades, for your attention. All the best.

#### PRAVDA Editorial

PM220803 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 87 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Together Toward the Common Goal: Unity of Action and Cohesion Increases the Socialist Community's Strength"]

[Excerpts] Cooperation among the ruling communist parties was and still is the soul of the community countries' political collaboration. The regular top-level meetings and contacts among leaders of the fraternal parties and states, which have recently acquired a truly comradely nature, are of special, exceptional significance here. Convincing new confirmation of this was provided by the 9-11 April official friendly visit M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made to Czechoslovakia at the invitation of the CPCZ Central Committee. Having examined its results, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo approved the work M.S. Gorbachev did during that visit and the results of the conversations and talks with the Czechoslovak leaders.

During the Soviet leader's visit the socialist states' determination to spare no effort to prevent nuclear conflagration, improve the international situation, and create normal external conditions for the peoples' peaceful labor resounded from Prague with fresh force. The new Soviet initiatives on questions of eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe and on other disarmament problems have elicited broad responses in the world. These important proposals open up the way to lower the level of military confrontation on our continent while according with the interests of all European states. The fraternal community countries fully support the new Soviet initiatives and make their contribution to the struggle for peace and the people's security. The more vigorously and enterprisingly each of the countries acts, the more successfully the socialist states will strive for the common goal of ensuring lasting peace on earth.

The visit to Czechoslovakia was a portentous landmark in the development of fraternal relations between the two countries. The top-level talks and the warm, cordial meetings with the Republic's working people developed into a vivid demonstration of the unbreakable cohesion of our parties and states. The visit was a major event in international life. It showed once again that the CPSU and the Soviet Union will do everything to further strengthen the community countries' unity and consolidate peace and the peoples' security.

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CSO: 5200/1435

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PRC RUSSIAN BROADCAST VIEWS NEW DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

OW140858 Beijing in Russian to the USSR 1800 GMT 13 Apr 87

["Review of international events" program: "On the New Gorbachev Proposal"]

[Text] Soviet leader Gorbachev made a new disarmament proposal in Prague on 10 April. The main content of this proposal is as follows:

First, the USSR and the United States should immediately start talks on eliminating intermediate- and short-range missiles in Europe. The two sides would undertake during the talks not to increase the number of operational and tactical missiles.

Second, a conference of foreign ministers of the 35 countries that belong to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be convened in order to adopt a decision on commencing talks on the reduction of tactical nuclear arms, armed forces, and conventional arms. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss the issue of imbalances of conventional forces possibly existing in Europe.

As it has been reported, the United States and West European countries cautiously welcome the new Gorbachev proposal.

Soviet leader Gorbachev in his late February protocol on eliminating missiles in Europe accepted the West's zero option on long- and intermediate-range missiles and renounced his demand to link this issue with the American "Star Wars" program. However, the deeper the Soviet-American Geneva talks on the zero option for intermediate-range missiles in Europe go, the greater the doubt of the West European countries in this option. They are mostly concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union will have very great superiority in the sphere of intermediate- and short-range missiles, after the total elimination of American and Soviet long- and intermediate-range missiles in Europe. This made them demand a coordination of the issues of long- and intermediate-range missiles with the issues of intermediate- and short-range missiles.

This was recently emphasized by both Margaret Thatcher, the UK prime minister, in Moscow, and Chirac, the French prime minister, in Washington. Voices in favor of this have been heard lately even in the FRG, which is actively struggling to achieve, first of all, an agreement on the zero option for long- and intermediate-range missiles.

The United States, however, proposed to the Soviet Union to include limits for intermediate- and short-range missiles in the treaty on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. It brought the talks on elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe to a standstill.

Now Gorbachev has proposed a second zero option--that is, the proposal to eliminate intermediate- and short-range missiles, in order to allay the apprehensions of West European countries on this matter. The West, however, believes the Warsaw Pact has superiority in conventional arms, and NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy balances this superiority of the Warsaw Pact by means of nuclear arms. This is why Western Europe always stands against the denuclearization of Europe.

In connection with this, Gorbachev declared in his third proposal that the USSR has agreed to discuss the issue of imbalances of conventional forces possibly existing in Europe. The new proposal was made by Gorbachev on the eve of the visit to Moscow of Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state. Observers consider it to be an answer to the West's demands.

This is why this proposal has attracted general attention. Can the U.S.-Soviet talks on intermediate-range missiles be moved from the present standstill? We shall wait for indications after Shultz's visit.

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CSO: 5200/4093

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC: SHULTZ, GORBACHEV 'UPBEAT' ON ARMS REDUCTION

OW160116 Beijing XINHUA in English 0105 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, April 15 (XINHUA)--U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz wrapped up his three-day visit to Moscow today by declaring that much progress has been made on Euromissiles, then left this evening for Brussels to brief Washington's NATO allies on his talks with Soviet leaders.

Shultz struck an upbeat note at a press conference shortly before leaving, saying "we made quite a lot of progress and perhaps we can see prospects, with hard negotiations ahead, but prospects close at hand of reaching agreement in that area," referring to a medium-range missile agreement. But he added that hard work is still needed to reach an agreement on Euromissiles.

Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had their last round of talks today, focussing on international security and bilateral relations. They also discussed regional problems. Observers here say there are signs that sharp differences remain over almost all major issues discussed during their three days of wide-ranging talks despite some progress made on reaching an accord to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe and other areas.

Both sides seem ready to keep up diplomatic contacts in a bid to reach some agreement on arms control and pave the way to a summit between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

Shultz said at the press conference that the issue of Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 short-range missiles remains the sticking point for an agreement on medium-range forces, despite a proposal made Tuesday by Gorbachev to abolish all shorter-range missiles within one year as part of a Euromissile deal.

Shultz insisted that Washington have the right to create shorter-range missiles and deploy them in numbers approximately equal to those of the Soviet Union before an agreement to set mutual ceilings on the number of such missiles is reached.

Shultz said he stopped short of making a response to Gorbachev's new proposal at their talks as the United States needs to consult with its allies first. He said he would be carrying the proposal with him to a meeting of NATO ministers in Brussels, Belgium, on Thursday.

At a Kremlin meeting Wednesday with a U.S. congressional delegation led by Jim Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives, Gorbachev elaborated on his new proposal on shorter-range missiles.

The Soviet leader said his country is willing to "unilaterally destroy" all operational-tactical nuclear missiles "within several months and about one year." He used the word "destroy" when speaking with Wright's delegation about the short-range missile offer, not "eliminate" as he had when he first put forward the proposal in a meeting with Shultz Tuesday.

In talks with Shultz, Gorbachev said the Soviets would be willing to write into any accord on medium-range missiles an agreement to eliminate its shorter-range weaponry now deployed in Czechoslovakia and Democratic Germany "in a relatively short and clearly defined timeframe."

Gorbachev stressed that the U.S. side should not increase its shorter-range missiles, noting that the increase of such missiles by the U.S. would "contradict the very essence of the process of disarmament."

At Wednesday's meeting, Gorbachev said the Soviet Union and the United States were close to reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles that would be linked to operational-range missiles. He sounded more upbeat than Soviet President Andrey Gromyko, who told the U.S. delegation that what Shultz had said in Moscow did "not present a basis for an accord. [no end quote as received]

At the press conference, Shultz said the United States advocates complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, but said Moscow wanted both sides to retain 100 warheads deployed on intermediate-range missiles on their own territories.

Despite the progress on Euromissiles, the U.S. secretary of state noted he "can't say the same on strategic arms and on space." But he said agreement reached on the general idea of a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms was a good result in itself.

Speaking to reporters, Shevardnadze described it as unlikely for Moscow and Washington to achieve treaties on strategic weapons and space defenses before Reagan leaves office in January 1989.

On the prospects of a summit, Shultz said such a meeting must be substantial and well-prepared.

Shultz conveyed a letter from Reagan to Gorbachev Tuesday inviting the Soviet leader to the United States. Gorbachev reportedly said he will not go to Washington if the two superpowers do not reach an agreement on medium-range missiles and on "key provisions" about strategic offensive arms, anti-ballistic missile systems and nuclear tests.

Asked to comment on the possibility of a summit, Shevardnadze said "if we do get an agreement, then I think it's quite realistic to speak of the possibility" of Gorbachev making a visit to Washington.

There was a "rather good prospect" of a Washington summit between Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the Soviet foreign minister said.

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CSO: 5200/4095

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PRC JOURNAL ON 'GREAT DIFFICULTIES' YET TO BE RESOLVED

HK291358 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 17, 27 Apr 87 p 24

["Special Dispatch From Moscow" by Tang Xiushan (0781 4423 1472): "Progress Made in Talks, Differences Remaining Serious--Comments on Shultz' Visit to the Soviet Union"]

[Text] The recent talks between U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet leaders have shown that serious differences still remain between the Soviet Union and United States on arms control and a series of other issues. Although some progress has been made in the intermediate-range missile issue, there is still far to go before an agreement can be concluded.

Shultz visited Moscow from 13 to 15 April at the Soviet Government's invitation. This is the first high-ranking meeting between the Soviet Union and United States since last October, when the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik summit reached a deadlock on the disarmament issue, and since 28 February this year, when the Soviet Union suggested that the issue of intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe be isolated from the "package deal" proposal and resolved separately.

The Soviet Union holds that at the moment, the removal of intermediate-range missiles from Europe is the "essential first steps toward disarmament." Therefore, it hopes the two sides can make a breakthrough on this issue through talks. Seeing that the West is worried about Soviet superiority in short-range missiles after intermediate-range missiles are removed, Gorbachev suggested in his speech in Prague on 10 April that the talks be started on the reduction and subsequent removal from Europe of missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km. However, he emphasized that the talks on this issue must not be linked to the course and result of settlement of the intermediate-range missile issue and that both parties must be committed not to increase tactical missiles during the negotiations.

During the talks, Shultz insisted that the solution to the intermediate-range missile issue must be linked with the solution to the short-range missile issue and that the United States is entitled to raise the number of its short-range missiles to that of the Soviet Union. When meeting with Shultz, Gorbachev made yet another concession, expressing the Soviet Union's intention to put down in the proposed intermediate-range missile agreement its unilateral commitment that it will remove all its campaign and tactical missiles from Europe within a rather short and clearly defined period. Shultz did not make any immediate response, but told Gorbachev that the United States had to consult with its allies on this suggestion because this issue concerning short-range missiles of high mobility needed a package settlement. Shultz said the United States agreed to keep down the number of campaign and tactical missiles but would reserve, according to the principle of equality, the right to increase the number of missiles of this type before an agreement on quantitative control was reached.



Although this round of talks did not result in any agreement, both sides have appeared quite optimistic. Gorbachev said: The two sides are about to conclude an agreement on the question of linking intermediate-range missiles with short-range ones. Shultz said: Great progress has been made on the intermediate-range missile issue and there is a possibility of reaching an agreement this year. But great difficulties have yet to be resolved in the forthcoming rounds of talks.

According to President Reagan's instruction, Shultz suggested, as soon as the discussion on strategic nuclear arms opened, that the period to fulfill the goal of reducing the number of strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent be extended from 5 years, as agreed before, to 7 years, and the period for observance of the 1972 ABM treaty to be shortened from 10 years to 5 years. In response to this proposal, the Soviet Union charged the United States of falling back from the stand that both sides had agreed on in Reykjavik. During the talks on reduction of strategic weapons, Gorbachev particularly stressed the importance of observance of the ABM treaty, declaring that the Soviet Union would never agree to an automatic extension of the arms race into outer space and that it would be impossible to conclude any agreement on the issue of strategic offensive weapons if the United States violated the ABM treaty. Shultz, however, emphasized that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, which was to be carried out within a scope approved by the ABM treaty, would never involve any violation of the treaty. Shultz also asserted: The United States insists on interpretation of the treaty in its broad sense.

It must be noted that Gorbachev has assumed a new concessive posture respecting space armaments. In the past, he emphasized that the development of space weapon systems should be confined only to laboratory work. But this time he said: The Soviet Union agrees that research in this field can be conducted in research institutes, experimental fields, or plants on the earth, and it is up to experts to decide which devices should not be sent into space. He said: This is the Soviet Union's "last attempt" to seek a compromise. In spite of this, the United States still disagrees that any restrictions be imposed on its space defense research program. Shultz at last said at a press conference that he saw no substantial changes in the two sides' stands on the space armaments issue.

Gorbachev suggested that "some key articles" be drawn up regarding the issues concerning strategic offensive weapons, the ABM treaty, and nuclear testing, so that these articles could be put into the treaty on intermediate-range missiles to be signed at the highest level and serve as the basis for an accord that will be legally binding on both the Soviet Union and United States. Shultz did not make any direct reply to this proposal, but expressed his wish for progress in the talks on strategic weapons in which experts can continue to discuss the issue of nuclear testing.

The Soviet Union and the United States have also discussed other issues concerning arms control, as well as issues concerning espionage, bilateral economic relations, human rights, and regional conflicts. No agreement has been reached. But both sides expressed hope for improvement of the relations between them. Agreeing that this round of talks had enabled them to better understand each other, both sides showed their intention to further the discussion in various forms in the future. It is reported that the two sides have completely agreed to make concerted efforts to solve the intermediate-range missile issue. During the visit, the Soviet Union and United States signed an accord on cooperation in peaceful research and utilization of outer space.

The Soviet-U.S. Moscow talks indicate once again that there are very profound political differences and uncompromising contradictions between the two superpowers, but for the moment both sides need to continue their political dialogue as they match each other in strength. With regard to the armament issue, each side wishes to conclude some agreements favorable to itself. But as the matter concerns military superiority and is very complicated, it is really difficult to reach any agreement. With regard to the intermediate-range missile issue, although both sides have announced that "substantial progress has been made" in their talks, it seems that the United States intends to take advantage of the Soviet Union's eagerness in reaching agreement and thus force it to make more concessions in other aspects. [paragraph continues]

Also, the United States has to take the opinions of its Western European allies into account, while a fundamental stand assumed by the latter is based on their need for nuclear deterrent forces to safeguard their security. Therefore, the prospects of the Soviet-U.S. talks depend to a very large extent on Western Europe's attitude and on the bargaining during the Geneva talks in the future. It appears that Gorbachev's visit to Washington will be possible only after an agreement is concluded between the two sides on the issue of intermediate-range missiles.

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CSO: 5200/4094

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### BEIJING RUSSIAN COMMENTARY ON 'KEY STAGE' IN INF TALKS

OW290109 Beijing in Russian to the USSR 1800 GMT 20 Apr 87

[International News Review: (Hung Bo) commentary: "Key Stage in the USSR-U.S. Talks on Intermediate-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Dear Soviet radio listeners: U.S. Secretary of State Shultz' visit to Moscow has shown that the USSR and the United States have made great progress on the issue of intermediate-range missiles. Shultz said at the Moscow press conference that concluding an agreement on elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe presents some problems. Shevardnadze also said that fairly excellent prospects for reaching an agreement at a Soviet-American summit meeting have appeared, if such a meeting takes place this year in Washington.

Experts on arms control state that, despite numerous disagreements between the two sides on the issue of intermediate-range missiles, the possibility of making great progress on this issue has greatly increased. In our news review today, we shall broadcast a commentary by our colleague (Hung Bo) on this issue.

The issue of intermediate-range missiles is one of the pressing problems in Soviet-American relations. After the USSR proposed, on 28 February, to isolate the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe from the package of problems and conclude a separate agreement on them, the U.S.-Soviet Geneva arms control talks made some progress. However, new disagreement between the two sides on the issues of the relationship between intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, and on inspection and measures to eliminate intermediate-range missiles soon appeared. The United States demanded inclusion of articles on short-range missiles in the agreement on intermediate-range missiles. So, the process towards agreement on this issue between the two sides stopped again.

To restart the process towards an agreement on intermediate-range missiles, on the eve of Shultz' visit to Moscow, Gorbachev announced in the CSSR a new version of settlement of the issue of intermediate- and short-range missiles. He declared that the Soviet Union would dismantle its short-range missiles in the GDR and CSSR immediately on reaching an agreement on intermediate-range missiles and, at the meeting with Shultz, Gorbachev reiterated the USSR's readiness to include its commitment to complete elimination of operational and tactical missiles in a relatively short and accurately defined period, into the agreement on intermediate-range missiles. The Soviet declaration drew serious attention from the Western public, which considers this useful in overcoming the main obstacles in the path to reaching a compromise on the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

The United States also showed its interest. As has become known from the Gorbachev-Shultz meeting, open problems remain between the USSR and the United States, requiring a lot of work before a solution can be found.

Among these open problems, for example, are the following:

1. The United States insists on complete elimination of intermediate-range weapons on both sides, while the Soviet Union proposes that each side retain 100 warheads for intermediate-range missiles.
2. The Soviet Union demands inclusion of articles on strict inspection in the agreement, while the United States is apprehensive that these measures would be detrimental.

The United States will also coordinate its position on the new Soviet proposal with its West European allies.

Currently, the Soviet-American intermediate-range missiles talks have entered a key stage. According to observers, the position of the West European countries on this problem is the key to reaching an agreement. Since the Soviet-American Reykjavik summit meeting, the West European countries have been concerned over the fact that the talks on eliminating intermediate-range missiles in Europe would eventually lead to denuclearization of Western Europe. So, they have driven themselves up a blind alley.

The zero option was, first of all, proposed by the NATO members themselves and, if they now oppose this plan, this would create the impression that NATO wants to hinder the achievement of a disarmament agreement. But, if they support total elimination of intermediate- and short-range missiles, West Europe would find itself in a disadvantageous position in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces. That is why they demand that the Soviet Union greatly reduce conventional arms, or insist on retaining a certain quantity of nuclear arms in Western Europe.

It is reported that the permanent representatives of the 16 NATO countries met on 15 April to discuss the Soviet proposal on elimination of short-range missiles in Europe. The NATO diplomats declared their unwillingness to eliminate NATO's new types of modern arms. Besides, Great Britain, France, and the FRG have unambiguously objected to gradual denuclearization of Western Europe. These opinions will probably not be ignored by the United States at the Geneva talks with the Soviet Union.

This shows that the Soviet Union and the United States will, in all probability, be able to reach a certain compromise in the near future on the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. However, a complex and difficult struggle between the two sides for balancing short-range missiles and conventional arms will remain. It will be especially difficult to reach an agreement on questions of strategic arms reduction and space defense.

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CSO: 5200/4093

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### XINHUA ON POSSIBLE EUROMISSILE TALKS BREAKTHROUGH

OW231519 Beijing XINHUA in English 1439 GMT 23 Apr 87

["News analysis: Any Breakthrough in Euromissile Talks? (by Ren Zhengde)"]--  
XINHUA headline]

[Text] Geneva, 23 April (XINHUA)--The United States and the Soviet Union resume their arms control talks in Geneva today, with the world waiting to see if any breakthrough on an agreement to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe is possible.

The possibility of such an agreement has increased greatly since U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's three days of talks in Moscow last week.

The current meeting, the eighth round between the United States and the Soviet Union, will be a test of both superpowers' willingness to scrap their medium-range missiles in Europe. A breakthrough depends on their putting words into deeds.

The U.S.-Soviet arms control talks began in March 1985, divided on strategic, medium-range and space weapons. The three categories of weapons were treated separately.

From the beginning, the dispute on the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), known as "Star Wars" program, has been the main obstacle in the talks. In an attempt to halt the "Star Wars" program, the Soviet Union proposed to link the strategic, medium-range and space arms talks together, but the U.S. balked, so the talks dragged on without making any progress.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced in February that he was no longer insisting on linkage between medium-range and space arms. He agreed to work out separate agreements. Gorbachev's proposal revived the deadlocked arms talks, bringing the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe into the spotlight, and the two sides were optimistic.

However, the Soviet Union and the United States were still split over strategic and space arms.

The U.S. now wants to reach an agreement on cutting the strategic weapons in half in seven years rather than the five years as proposed at the Reykjavik summit last October. The Soviet Union charges that the U.S. is backing away from its own proposals and is deliberately accelerating the arms race. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continues trying to restrict "Star Wars."

Gorbachev launched a series of offensives by offering new arms reduction proposals on medium-range missiles, trying to make headway on the disarmament talks and eventually gain an early agreement. Gorbachev is aware that U.S. President Ronald Reagan has little time left in office, and dearly wants to crown his presidency with a major arms deal.

The Soviets, presuming that an agreement on medium-range missiles will deter the implementation of "Star Wars" program, wants the talks to focus on the removal of these missiles from Europe.

Today's talks is to cover a draft treaty on medium-range missiles. Talks on strategic and space weapons will be delayed to early May.

Gorbachev's recent proposal made during Shultz's visit includes two "zero options." One calls for the elimination of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles (1,000 to 5,000 kilometer range) in Europe. The other proposes the scrapping of all shorter-range missiles (500 to 1,000 kilometer range) there.

The Soviet leader proposed talks on short-range missiles (under 500 kilometer range) and conventional forces be left for discussion at the European Security Conference of 35 nations.

While they are close to agreement on medium-range missiles, the two sides are still far apart on shorter-range missiles. Statistics show the Soviets have a six to one advantage in such missiles. (400 Soviet SS-22 and SS-23 to 72 U.S. Pershing IA)

To redress Soviet superiority, the U.S. has been insisting on linking the shorter-range missile issue to an INF Treaty. It said it would only sign an INF pact if it can equal the number of Soviet shorter-range missiles now in Eastern Europe.

Unexpectedly, the Soviet Union responded with an even more radical proposal--another "zero" option to scrap shorter-range missiles. This caught the United States unprepared and put it into a dilemma.

American allies in Europe are deeply concerned about the "two zero options" formula. They fear the removal of all American nuclear weapons will "decouple" European and American defenses and expose Western Europe to superior Soviet conventional forces and chemical weapons.

Reports said the U.S. might suggest the deployment of neutron bombs in the region to assure West European countries.

There are also problems on verification of a possible INF agreement. The U.S. drafted an "extremely strict verification" proposal, insisting that "on-site inspections" at every manufacturing, assembling, storing, deploying and dismantling site. It also wanted 10 surprise inspections each year at suspicious buildings.

The Soviet Union went even further by saying that there should be no limits on inspections, including visits to privately-owned arms plants in the United States.

Both sides fear the other's cheating, and sees the other's inspections as a chance to spy. This issue is further complicated by the sovereignty problem of the East and West European countries where the superpower missiles are deployed.

In addition, while the Soviets were permitted to retain 100 medium-range missiles in its Asia territories they strongly oppose an American plan to deploy its 100 medium-range missiles in Alaska. They said the missiles in Alaska could reach Soviet territory while their missiles in Asia could not hit targets in the United States.

In light of the fact there still exist a lot of difficulties, political or technical, hard bargaining is expected to proceed any breakthrough as forecast by Secretary of State Shultz that both sides face "hard negotiations."

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CSO: 5200/4092

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### XINHUA VIEWS NATO OPPOSITION TO USSR DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

OW241812 Beijing XINHUA in English 1750 GMT 24 Apr 87

["News analysis: Killing Three Birds With One Stone (by Xia Zhimian)"--  
XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, 24 April (XINHUA)--The Soviet Union says it will scrap its nuclear missiles in Europe, but a Western defense minister says, "no you shouldn't." Strange? Yes. But it is true.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed that after an agreement to remove all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles (1,000 to 5,000 kilometer range) from Europe has been signed, they would discuss scrapping all shorter-range missiles (500 to 1,000 kilometer range) deployed in the region within one year.

Since the U.S. has very few shorter-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet proposal is tantamount to declaring a unilateral dismantling of its 130 such missiles in Europe.

The Soviets are just "killing three birds with one stone" by putting these offers before the West, it is observed here. First of all, the removal of medium-range nuclear missiles means, as was put by some Federal German politicians, a "decoupling" of the U.S. and West European defenses. It will weaken the American "nuclear umbrella" protecting Western Europe. Thus the Soviets, they say, are driving a wedge between the allies.

Secondly, the Soviet plan on shorter-range missiles is seen just as another divisive gambit. If these missiles are eliminated, the possibility of a nuclear war on Federal German territory will increase because the remaining Soviet short-range missiles (150 to 500 kilometer range) could only reach Federal Germany.

The country will be less secure than Britain or France, people fear here.

Thirdly, the Soviets have been successful in putting West European leaders on the spot with their voters. Gorbachev's proposals are popular and politicians have a tough time explaining why they are not jumping at them.



Therefore, it is ironic that this disarmament gift was not welcomed by West European leaders who had had the most urgent need for disarmament. West German newspapers say the Soviets are holding the high hand in the "disarmament poker game," leaving the West in a dilemma.

Western European leaders are not sure how much support they can expect from the U.S. after a deal. It is difficult for politicians to explain the undesirable impact of the attractive offer from the Soviets. There is also the problem of just how much they should agree to.

Federal German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner bluntly refused Gorbachev's proposal, saying Gorbachev's "zero option" should be limited to medium-range missiles.

Since the U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit last October, Gorbachev has played a number of strong cards: Accepting West European's "zero option" on medium-range missiles, dropping the linkage of the U.S. "Star Wars" program to a proposed Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, proposing talks on shorter-range missiles and declaring Soviet willingness to unilaterally scrap them.

These concessions have aroused the interest of the West, but also intensified disputes within the Western alliance.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, seeking a breakthrough in INF negotiations as a chance to ease the embarrassment caused by the Iran arms scandal, has been enthusiastic about developments. He has repeatedly proclaimed his optimism on the chances of signing an INF pact this year.

To the West European public, the Soviet proposals might be a breakthrough in decades-old disarmament talks. A number of European politicians have called the proposals a "historic opportunity."

Recent opinion poll shows that 60 percent of Federal Germans interviewed believe that Gorbachev really wants disarmament while 44 percent have the same faith in Reagan.

West European countries have found it very hard to refuse the "zero option" on medium-range missiles because they originally suggested it. They also hope an INF deal could start comprehensive superpower disarmament and relax regional tensions.

Still, many Westerners are looking for hidden Soviet ploys in Gorbachev's offer. Woerner and other Federal German politicians pointed to "hidden meanings" in the Soviet proposals.

Western Europe's dilemma is obvious. To sign removal deals with the Soviets, one zero settlement after another, will end with an American withdrawal from Europe and the "denuclearization" of the region. The North Atlantic Treaty Organizations's flexible response strategy, comprising conventional and nuclear responses to Soviet attack, will end.

And perhaps of greatest concern, the Soviet's superiority in the field of conventional forces would be more formidable in a non-nuclear Europe.

So far, the Western countries have endorsed the removal of medium-range missiles but have differed on the shorter-range ones. Some incline to accept the Soviets' proposal. They say why not let the Soviets dismantle their 130 shorter missiles and then discuss conventional disarmament?

Others are set against a shorter-range deal. They suggest a ceiling on these weapons so as to retain some Western nuclear deterrent in the region.

But they cannot say if the public will accept the replacing of medium-range missiles in their countries with shorter-range ones.

Reports say Reagan has asked West European countries to work out a common position by the end of May so bargaining with the Soviets can begin in earnest. Forging a common position on such a major issue will be a trying chore as West European leaders are left with the choice between the rock and hard place.

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CSO: 5200/4092

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### BRIEFS

SOVIET ASIAN MISSILE POSITION CRITICIZED--Washington, 22 April (XINHUA)--The new Soviet position seeking a separate agreement to eliminate short-range missiles in its eastern area is "unacceptable," a U.S. official said today. Arms control director, Kenneth Adelman said Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's Tuesday statement is "somewhat of a walk-back" from what was agreed during U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's visit to Moscow last week, when both agreed to eliminate the missiles globally. Adelman, who accompanied Shultz on the tour, said the United States insisted "there cannot be a dichotomy between systems in Europe and systems in Asia." "The Soviets, and Mr Gorbachev himself," he said, "agreed with Secretary Shultz that it had to be global limits." "Now, yesterday, he (Gorbachev) is saying, 'let's limit in Europe right now, and Asia later on,' which is not global limits," he asserted. The Soviet position, made public at a luncheon for visiting Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski, advocates eliminating short-range missiles simultaneously in Europe and to hold talks on such missiles in the East Soviet Union and the United States. "It is a stumbling block if they want to limit the systems only in Europe, and not to include Asian systems at all," Adelman said. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0056 GMT 23 Apr 87 OW] /12858

CSO: 5200/4092

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: CDE RESULTS ASSESSED, CONCLUDING DOCUMENT PUBLISHED

### Results Assessed

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 12, Dec 87 pp 131-133, 151

[Article by Yuri Rakhmaninov]

[Text]

The first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe came officially to a close in Stockholm on September 19, 1986 (to conclude it in actual fact, the "clock was stopped" and the final plenary meeting prolonged till September 22). An important component of the general European process, the conference opened on January 17, 1984, as decided by the Madrid follow-up meeting on September 6, 1983. According to the provisions of the Concluding Document, the "conference mandate", formulated in Madrid, the task of the participants in the Stockholm forum was to discuss and approve a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures in order to reduce the danger of military confrontation in Europe.

The follow-up (third) meeting of the participating states of the CSCE, which opened in Vienna on November 4, 1986, is to discuss ways and means of continuing efforts in the sphere of security and disarmament, including the issue of the mandate of the follow-up (second) stage of the Stockholm Conference, which is to discuss and adopt security and disarmament measures in Europe.

In practical terms, the document approved in Stockholm is an elaborate set of political and military measures intended to lessen the danger of military confrontation in Europe, the most heavily armed continent. It specifies and gives effect to the principle of non-use of force; furthermore, it contains confidence- and security- building measures in the military field.

The Stockholm document includes an accord between the participants in the CSCE on non-use of force or the threat of force in any form, including the most dangerous form, armed force. Thus a substantive step has been taken to make this commitment an effective law of international relations which no one may violate.

The participating countries have committed themselves to give prior notification 42 days in advance of the start of all exercises by ground troops in combination with air or naval components whenever over 13,000 troops and 300 battle tanks are involved. With regard to air force exercises, a special sublimit has been established: 200 sorties by aircraft in the course of the exercises; beginning with it, the necessary information will be supplied. Experts estimate that this virtually covers 90 per cent of air force activity in Europe.

Prior notification will be given by states on exercises as well as on troop movements, transfers and concentrations. This implies, in particular, that from now on the United States will have to give notification of every transfer of its troops to Europe in excess of the strength mentioned above. It is evident that such accords help reduce the hazard of military conflict and hence make for a more tranquil and stable situation in Europe.

The countries concerned will exchange annual plans of their military activities that are subject to prior notification. This is one of the most important sections of the agreement; it shows how very far the participants in the CSCE will go to meet each other half-way in order to remove mutual suspicion and change the tenor of thinking from military to peaceful.

Beginning with the 17,000 troop limit, observers are to be invited to every military activity, whether an exercise, a movement or a transfer of troops. As these invitations are obligatory, all participating countries will be able to satisfy themselves that the military activity in question conforms to the accord on prior notification and threatens no one. Agreement has been also reached on some elements of limiting military exercises. However, this is only a beginning, and the theme will be elaborated and carried deeper afterwards.

The provisions concerning inspection are among the most important parts of the Stockholm accords. This issue has been, and indeed remains, a stumbling-block in many disarmament talks. Not without malicious intent, it has been rumoured that the Soviet Union objected to any control and would never allow inspectors into its territory.

The Stockholm document has refuted that false rumour. Where there is an object of serious agreement, whether on disarmament or confidence-building measures, the Soviet Union, naturally, is interested as much as other countries in all states unfailingly meeting their commitments. Our country agreed along with others that each state situated in the area covered by the confidence-building measures should allow no more than three inspections per calendar year on its territory. In coming to terms on this, account was taken, of course, of the legitimate security interests of states. No inspections will be conducted in restricted areas, or at military and other defence installations. It is, in effect, the first agreement on armaments in history providing for on-site inspection.

There are four annexes to the Stockholm document which concern the following: (1) the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures; it will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area (in this context, the notion of adjoining sea area refers also to ocean areas adjoining Europe) and to its air space; (2) the date of entry into force of the accords on exchanging annual plans for military activities and restrictive provisions; (3) a statement by the chairman of the plenary meeting that each participating state can raise any question consistent with the conference mandate at any stage subsequent to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting; (4) the stipulation that inspection on the territory of a participating state can not be conducted by its allies which are participants in the CSCE.

The Stockholm conference failed to come to terms on all the issues whose settlement would have fully ensured the laying of solid foundations for confidence and security in Europe. However, the results of the Stockholm forum are the maximum of what is possible at present, and they can serve as the starting point for working out new effective solutions conducive to real disarmament in Europe.

By adopting agreed confidence-building measures in the military sphere, the conference created important prerequisites for a more favourable climate of confidence and security in Europe. Indeed, the political aspects of European security will now rest on broader foundations of restrictive

measures in the military field than before. This certainly makes the preservation of peace and the promotion of cooperation in Europe more dependable.

At the same time, new prospects and opportunities are opening up for extending the Stockholm accords on confidence- and security-building measures to other continents, which would undoubtedly contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive international security system.

The results of the forum held in the Swedish capital carry forward in practice the Helsinki Final Act with due regard to present-day political and military realities in Europe. As a matter of fact, they constitute the first agreement within the framework of the far-reaching programme for peace, disarmament and security advanced by the Soviet Union in the Statement which the General Secretary of the CPSU CC made on January 15, 1986.

The accords reached in Stockholm were made possible by the steadfast efforts of socialist countries, neutral and non-aligned states, of all participants in the conference, by the political realism and sense of responsibility which they showed. This enabled them to overcome many barriers and difficulties in seeking a compromise based on a mutually acceptable balance of the security interests of all participating countries.

The state of affairs at the conference was constantly in the focus of attention of the leaderships of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Stockholm forum also held a prominent place during meetings of leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Summit meetings and talks, such as the exchange of views between Soviet and French leaders early in July 1986, played an important part in the attainment of positive results in Stockholm. This also applies to talks between the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Britain, Italy, the FRG and other European countries. The problem of reaching agreement in Stockholm was among the subjects discussed during the September meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State George Shultz. These efforts produced the Stockholm document on confidence- and security-building measures.

"The Soviet leadership", says Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement on the results of the Stockholm Conference, "takes a positive view of the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. A big step has been taken towards easing tensions and creating a healthier international political climate, which is so necessary for the solution of vitally important problems of this nuclear age.

"It is a victory for common sense, a gain for all the thirty-five countries which participated in the conference. They proved equal to rising above differences and achieving accords which are important in themselves and, furthermore, are improving the outlook for bringing about a stable situation in Europe. The Stockholm success can serve to extend the atmosphere of confidence at international level as well.

"The Soviet Union sees in this agreement the sprouts of a new way of thinking in world politics that are shooting forth on European soil. Stockholm has proved that even in a complicated situation it is possible to come to terms on security issues provided there is a desire and political will. It is an example of how the new edifice of detente and new relations between states can and should be built".

The Stockholm accords are evidence that the policy of detente has large potentialities and that the logic of confrontation has had its day while the trend towards lasting peace has deep roots and is essentially irreversible. They provide a favourable basis for further headway towards a stage-by-stage realisation of effective and concrete actions aimed at promoting and

intensifying the general European process as a whole started over ten years ago in the Finnish capital.

The results of the Stockholm Conference are important for the Vienna meeting of the CSCE participating states. They are an earnest of success in starting the second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The Vienna CSCE meeting should help bring about new important accords in all the spheres envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act. It should be used for carrying forward the many-sided European process in order to solve the problems of concern to all Europeans.

Interested in the achievement of positive results at Vienna as they are, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries consider that European security should be based on a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures in the political and military spheres, real steps towards disarmament in Europe and a system of cooperation between countries in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural, humanitarian and other spheres on the principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. Such cooperation provides a solid material basis for European security. In all these spheres, the Helsinki accords meet the objective requirements of the fast-growing internationalisation of the economic, political and cultural activity of nations as a result of scientific and technological progress.

There is no doubt that Europe can and should contribute actively to the effort to bring about a sharp turn in favour of the policy of peace and detente. It has ample and instructive historical experience and should set an inspiring example in this matter.

#### Text of Document

[Editorial report] Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 12, December 87 publishes on pages 134-143 the text of the 19 September 1986 Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1440

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### USSR: CIVILIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS BEING CONDUCTED IN URALS

#### Scientist on 19 April Blasts

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 21 Apr 87 p 1

[TASS item: "Academician Goldanskiy on Nuclear Blasts in Perm Region"]

[Text] The two small-yield nuclear explosions detonated in the Soviet Union 19 April were exclusively for civilian purposes, Academician Vitaly Goldansky told a TASS correspondent.

"They have nothing in common with the nuclear tests conducted by Soviet specialists at the test site near Semipalatinsk and by Americans in Nevada.

"The blasts near Perm were carried out not at a military test site, although they were underground.

"Explosive devices of all sorts were used for construction of roads, mines and water reservoirs," the Academician said. "They make construction much easier and cheaper."

"There is nothing new, the less so sensational, in nuclear explosive devices being used for civilian purposes," Goldansky said. "They are used, as a rule, when it is necessary to blow up especially heavy rock or a large mass of rock.

"Civilian nuclear explosive devices normally feature small yields. The yield of the explosions in the Perm region was, as the announcement said, less than 20 kilotons.

"They were conducted underground which is the only similarity with explosions at military test sites."

(TASS. 20 April. In full.)

#### Sweden Registers Explosions 23 April

AU231234 Paris AFP in English 1227 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Hagfors, Sweden, 23 Apr (AFP)--The Swedish military seismological observatory at Hagsfor Thursday morning registered signals from two presumed nuclear explosions west of the Ural mountains in the Soviet Union.



According to the observatory the two underground blasts, five minutes apart, reached 4.5 on the Richter scale, and were interpreted as weak explosions in hard rock.

The Soviet Union earlier this week acknowledged it had been using underground nuclear blasts for oil exploration, including two explosions in the Perm region of the Urals last Sunday.

A report Tuesday in the daily SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA said the explosions, with a power of less than 20 kilotonnes, created a system of crevasses which linked several small pockets of oil allowing easier extraction.

The paper quoted the chief engineer of the Permneft company, M.N. Kobiakov, as saying the technique was a world first, and that "the explosions have not affected the ecology of the region."

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CSO: 5200/1449

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. EQUIPMENT ARRIVES AT TEST MONITORING SITE

LD241024 Moscow TASS in English 0938 GMT 24 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS -- U.S. Equipment has been delivered to the seismic station Jaysbay in Kazakhstan (a Soviet Asian Republic) to conduct the second stage of the joint Soviet-American scientific experiment of monitoring nuclear testing. The experiment is being carried out in keeping with an agreement between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the U.S. National Resources Defence Committee, the newspaper TRUD said today. Seismographers are to be planted in three stations in Karkaralinsk, Karasu and Bayanaul at a depth of 100 metres. This will eliminate the impact of possible natural distortions and ensure full control.

Dr Holley Eisler, a seismologist of California University, told a correspondent of the newspaper TRUD that peoples should live in peace, therefore she is taking part in the experiment. She noted that the joint experiment is not so much known in the USA as it is in the USSR, since the U.S. press prefers to pass it over in silence. Here we established full mutual understanding with the Soviet colleagues. We have been allowed into the test range area, but those who are preparing for war will never do so.

The preliminary results of the joint work have shown that there are no problems from the technical viewpoint involved in the international monitoring of nuclear tests, Holley Eisler said in conclusion.

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## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### TASS CALLS U.S. NUCLEAR TEST STAND 'UNCONSTRUCTIVE'

LD250828 Moscow TASS in English 0633 GMT 25 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 25 TASS -- The U.S. Administration is not planning to end nuclear testing and observe the Soviet-American SALT-2 treaty. This follows from the statement made on Friday by Charles Redman, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department.

He was asked at a briefing for newsmen to comment on the U.S. Administration's reaction on additional federal appropriations in the current fiscal year approved at the House of Representatives on Friday. The congressmen adopted amendments to that document making it incumbent upon the administration to end underground nuclear testing with a yield of more than one kilotons [as received] and observe limitations under the SALT-2 treaty.

Charles Redman said that the U.S. Administration's stand on these two problems had long been known. The White House, he said, views the bill on additional appropriations as being unacceptable since it makes it incumbent to abide by the provisions of the SALT-2 treaty and limits nuclear testing.

Indeed, official Washington's unconstructive stand on the question of putting an end to nuclear blasts and the need for observing the contractual-legal fundamentals of the process of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons has long been known. In the course of 18 months, while the Soviet Union observed its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear blasts proposing the USA to follow suit, Washington stubbornly refused to make this step that would open up a real prospect for reaching agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear testing.

The USA excused its stand by references that the ending of nuclear testing would, allegedly, jeopardise the U.S. nuclear weapons at the proper level. Use was made of a myth that the USA is "lagging behind the USSR" as regards the number of nuclear tests. In so doing, the administration tried to pass over in silence the fact that the USA needed nuclear testing to carry out work within the framework of the programme to militarise outer space.

As far as the Soviet-American SALT-2 treaty is concerned, the USA motivated its refusal to observe it by the claim that the highly important document had become ineffective and even put the U.S. side into a disadvantageous position. Yet, things were much simpler in real fact, since by rejecting the SALT-2 treaty the USA has simply gained for itself a free hand for a further build-up of strategic weapons.

Thus the latest statement by the spokesman for the U.S. State Department is evidence that Washington does not intend to change its attitude to the most important problems involved in curbing the arms race, an approach which prevents progress in the field of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS CITES GDR, CSSR PRESS ON NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR

### NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Article

PM071355 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Constructive Proposal"]

[Text] Berlin, 6 Apr--The GDR-CSSR proposal to FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl to begin talks on creating a nuclear weapon-free corridor in Central Europe is aimed at implementing the goal set at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik--the achievement of the world without nuclear weapons--NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes today.

The pursuit of a policy in the Reykjavik spirit, the commentary says, is synonymous today with the desire to destroy nuclear arsenals. Immediately after the Soviet initiative to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe was put forward the GDR urged the FRG to help implement this proposal with the aim of completely and finally ridding Europe of nuclear weapons.

The creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe would facilitate the withdrawal of all nuclear armaments systems from the territory of the FRG, the GDR, and the CSSR to a depth of 150 km on each side of the demarcation line between the two alliances. The governments could subsequently hold talks to extend the corridor, going as far as to create a Central Europe free of nuclear weapons. These practical and easily monitored steps would lead to a reduction in confrontation between the two military-political alliances and a strengthening of trust and security among all participating states and their neighbors and allies.

### RUDE PRAVO Editorial

PM091127 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "To Create a Nuclear-Free Corridor"]

[Text] Prague, 7 Apr--The proposal by the GDR and the CSSR concerning the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe is aimed at reducing military arsenals and improving the international situation in Europe, RUDE PRAVO writes today.

This joint initiative, an editorial says, ought to be examined in three aspects. First, the creation of nuclear-free zones helps to develop the universal process of disarmament; second, the FRG border with the CSSR and the GDR is the "line of contact" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, along which armies supplied with the latest equipment and nuclear weapons are facing each other. Third, this proposal is closely linked with the USSR's initiative on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

This West, which earlier called for the elimination of medium-range missiles in the continent of Europe, is now hastily changing its position, claiming that it apparently cannot simply give up the U.S. missiles in Europe, the newspaper points out. When they submitted their proposal, the GDR and the CSSR proceeded from considerations of the duty of all European states to make a contribution, via their own practical actions, to the common cause of nuclear disarmament, primarily in the continent of Europe. The 300-km corridor between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reduce the risk of a military conflict developing between the two alliances. This is why the two countries see the creation of this corridor in the heart of Europe as a step along the path to nuclear disarmament.

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## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### GDR COMMENT ON CENTRAL EUROPE NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR PROPOSAL

AU071617 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 6 Apr 87 p 2

[G.P. commentary: "Start at the Heart of Europe"]

[Text] The international public has noted with interest that the GDR has taken another initiative within the framework of the socialist peace initiative. Proceeding from the obligation of the two German states -- laid down in the Basic Agreement -- to safeguard peace, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, has suggested to FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl an opening of negotiations on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Europe. The CSSR Government addressed a proposal of the same wording to Bonn.

The new proposal aims at fulfilling a demand that was set as a target at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik, namely at creating a nuclear-free world. Now that, upon Soviet initiative, negotiations are being conducted in Geneva on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, possibilities for the realization are beginning to emerge. In order to free Europe completely and for all times from the devilish nuclear equipment, the GDR -- following the Gorbachev proposal on the zero-option -- has immediately taken the initiative and requested that the FRG contribute to the materialization of this idea. Meanwhile, first consultations at government level have taken place with the following result: The GDR and the FRG favor the withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles without any ifs and buts.

Erich Honecker's proposal on setting up a nuclear-free corridor, which is based on ideas and concepts that have been expressed by influential politicians from Western and Northern Europe, has given new dynamism to the processes that have been initiated. Taking into consideration that the two German states are located at the dividing line between Warsaw Pact and NATO and that the accumulation of nuclear weapons in this region makes the risk of a nuclear confrontation seem very high, Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme suggested the creation of a nuclear-free corridor many years ago. The GDR welcomed the idea which is now gaining increasing significance in connection with the talks on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

The proposal which has been on the FRG chancellor's desk since last weekend could lead first to the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons along the dividing line of the two alliances, thus creating a 150-km corridor on the FRG side and the GDR/CSSR side. Three years after the corridor is set up, the governments would decide on its extension to a central European nuclear-free zone.

It is obvious that such practicable steps which can easily be checked would reduce the risk of confrontation between the two military-political alliances, and considerably increase the confidence and safety for all states that are concerned, for their neighbors and allies. The danger of a nuclear inferno emanating from Europe would be noticeably reduced. And the effect the formation of a nuclear-free corridor would have on the solution of other problems, such as on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, should not be underrated either. Thus the proposal is also exactly in keeping with the Western governments' call for creating security with as few arms as possible.

Erich Honecner's negotiation proposal submitted to Helmut Kohl shows once more that the GDR is aware of its responsibility for peace, security, and reasonable coexistence of all peoples. In a constructive, flexible, and consistent manner the GDR is doing everything in its power -- together with its allies -- to improve the international situation and to reduce tensions. Making policy in the spirit of Reykjavik today means eliminating nuclear weapons from the world. And what is more obvious than starting where the arms are most densely concentrated -- at the heart of Europe?

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CSO: 5200/3006

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### PRAVDA CITES LONDON TIMES ON NEW ZEALAND ANTINUCLEAR POLICY

PM221411 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

["International Notes" by S. Kuznetsov: "Who Walks Upside Down"]

[Text] There is a well-known saying: Whatever the British leaders are thinking ends up on the pages of THE TIMES.

For example, THE TIMES recently published a report by its correspondent in Wellington that New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange had allegedly admitted in Parliament that his government had earlier concluded a secret agreement with Washington with the aim of ensuring that the U.S. military base remains in Christchurch to carry out Operation "Deep Freeze."

At first glance there would appear to be nothing sensational in this, as Operation "Deep Freeze" is a program to back up U.S. scientific research in the Antarctic, and the base in the New Zealand city of Christchurch is also used to equip American expeditions to the Antarctic. THE TIMES did not dwell long on this, however. According to the newspaper report, which cites a statement by James Bolger, leader of the opposition National Party, "this agreement also provides for U.S. Starlifter transport aircraft being able to continue flying via Christchurch even after New Zealand's adoption of antinuclear legislation" without having to report the kind of arms they are carrying.

Many leading mass information organs in the West have enthusiastically seized on this story and begun to rehash it in various forms, making various conjectures.

Everything was proceeding according to the book until D. Lange sent a letter to THE TIMES reproaching the newspaper for its "inaccurate" -- to put it mildly -- reporting of his statements. No "secret agreement" to maintain U.S. Antarctic facilities in Christchurch has been signed since New Zealand's adoption of antinuclear legislation, the prime minister points out. According to him, Wellington has never demanded guarantees from Washington that U.S. aircraft landing in Christchurch will not be carrying nuclear arms, as it relies on U.S. honesty to meet the provisions of the international Antarctic Treaty, to which it is signatory (this treaty unequivocally prohibits any military activity in the Antarctic).

How could statements by the head of the New Zealand Cabinet be so distorted?

Let us recall that in 1985 the representatives of 13 countries in the South Pacific approved a treaty on Rarotonga Island that proclaimed the region a nuclear-free zone.



Some of them -- Vanuatu and Tuvalu, for example -- have gone even further than the provisions of this agreement and, following Wellington's example, prohibit ships carrying nuclear power units or nuclear arms from docking at their ports. A coalition of the Labor Party and National Federation Party, which has an antinuclear program, won the Fiji elections quite recently.

Alice from the well-known tale by the English writer Lewis Carroll believed people walked upside down "on the other side of the world," by which people in Britain usually mean Australia and New Zealand. the same opinion could take shape in the minds of readers of THE TIMES, which has tried to turn the New Zealand Government's antinuclear policy upside down.

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CSO: 5200/1452

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### JAPANESE OPPOSE NUCLEAR TESTING IN SOUTH PACIFIC

BK101308 Hong Kong AFP in English 1100 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Papeete, April 10 (AFP) — Visiting Japanese Foreign Ministry official Nobuaki Tanaka has said here that Tokyo appreciates France's contribution to nuclear deterrence but opposes nuclear testing.

Mr. Tanaka, in charge of Japan's relations with the South Sea Islands, also said on Thursday that Tokyo closely followed Soviet diplomatic moves in the region as well as events concerning the Rarotonga Treaty for a nuclear-free south pacific.

The Japanese official arrived here from New Caledonia on Thursday for a four-day information visit to French Polynesia.

He had talks with French officials and was on Friday due to meet officials at France's nuclear testing headquarters.

Mr. Tanaka said that Japan's opposition to nuclear tests — which France carries out at its South Pacific Mururoa Atoll — was part of a policy geared at overall, progressive and balanced disarmament.

He also said Japan was ready to help the region's countries and to hold talks within the South Pacific Forum as well as with the South Pacific Commission.

Japanese Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari made a tour of the South Pacific region last January. Tokyo said the tour sought to fill a political vacuum left by Western powers and to counter Soviet gains in the region.

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CSO: 5200/2526

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: ZAGLADIN, DELEGATION HOLD TALKS IN STOCKHOLM

Arrive 6 Apr

LD060732 Moscow TASS in English 0720 GMT 6 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 6 TASS -- A delegation of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet has left Moscow for Stockholm for a return visit at the invitation of the Foreign Policy Commission of Sweden's Riksdag [parliament].

The delegation is led by Vadim Zagladin, secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department.

Visit Riksdag, Foreign Minister

PM101820 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In Sweden"]

[Excerpt] Stockholm, 7 Apr--The delegation visited the Riksdag and met with Ingegard Troedsson, first deputy chairman of the Riksdag. There was a discussion on further developing ties between the two countries' parliaments, ties that were being given new impetus by the recent visit to the USSR by a Riksdag delegation headed by Riksdag Chairman Ingemund Bengtsson.

During a conversation with members of the Riksdag Foreign Policy Commission the Soviet parliamentarians were acquainted with the Swedish representatives' views on a number of international problems and gave a detailed account of the USSR's position on curbing the arms race and removing the threat of world nuclear catastrophe.

Commission Chairman Stig Alemyr gave a luncheon in the Soviet delegation's honor.

The delegation was received by Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson. The two sides discussed topical problems of the present-day international situation as well as questions of further developing Soviet-Swedish relations. V.V. Zagladin informed the Swedish foreign minister about the USSR's foreign policy moves aimed at reversing the arms race, especially in nuclear arms, and making the process of disarmament irreversible.

S. Andersson stated that Sweden shares and supports the Soviet Union's peace initiatives, particularly its new proposal to remove all medium-range missiles from Europe, and expressed the hope that these will produce concrete results. He said the Swedish Government intends to continue playing an active role in the struggle for peace and disarmament, including within the "Delhi Six," to support the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe, and to oppose the militarization of space.

Both sides noted the positive development of Soviet-Swedish relations in many spheres and expressed their mutual desire to deepen equal good-neighbor cooperation between the two countries.

The delegation held a friendly meeting with the Union of Sweden-Soviet Union Societies' leadership. Representatives of the union of friendship societies described the work done by its local organizations to spread knowledge about Soviet life in Sweden. This work assumes special significance in view of the Great October Socialist Revolution's 70th anniversary, which is being celebrated this year. The delegation head acquainted the union's members with the process of restructuring and the radical transformations of all spheres of Soviet society's life. The Soviet parliamentarians wished the union's activists further successes in their work, which is a great contribution to the strengthening of mutual understanding and relations of friendship between the Soviet and Swedish peoples.

#### Meet With Swedish Officials

PM101551 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Visit Continues"]

[Excerpt] Stockholm, 8 Apr--The visit to Sweden by a delegation of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers headed by V.V. Zagladin, secretary of the Soviet of the Union Foreign Affairs Commission and first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, continuing.

The delegation met with Ivar Nordberg, chairman of the ruling Social Democratic Labor Party of Sweden parliamentary group.

Conversations took place with Ingemar Eliasson, deputy chairman of the People's Party, Olof Johansson, chairman of the Center Party, and Carl Bildt, chairman of the Moderate Coalition Party.

During their meetings and conversations the Soviet parliamentarians spoke about progress in resolving tasks of carrying out profound transformations in the life of Soviet society. They provided information on the USSR's new approach to resolving crucial problems of the present day, especially removing the threat of nuclear war, destroying all the world's nuclear weapons, reducing conventional weapons, and creating an all-embracing system of international security.

## Zagladin Holds News Conference

LD082152 Moscow TASS in English 2121 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Stockholm, 8 Apr (TASS)--A press conference was held at the Embassy of the USSR in Sweden today.

Those present were addressed by Vadim Zagladin, the leader of the visiting delegation of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet (parliament), secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union, first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

"The current international situation", the leader of the Soviet delegation said, "urgently calls for conducting a large-scale dialogue on the issues of strengthening security on earth and for manifesting a new political thinking, which is particularly essential in the realities of the nuclear-missile age as well as considering U.S. endeavors to turn outer space, too, into an arena for military confrontation".

"It is precisely such a new approach that is being shown in international relations now by the Soviet Union which strives to transact affairs with due account for the interests of all countries on a democratic basis".

"Such a policy is interconnected with the course towards reorganisation and democratisation of all spheres of life in Soviet society itself".

"Pursuing the course towards attaining the goals of general and complete disarmament, towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a system of comprehensive international security, the Soviet Union backs it up by practical deeds".

"This is illustrated once again by the Soviet Union's proposal on the elimination of all the medium-range missiles in Europe".

"The proposal not only opens up real opportunities to remove these weapons from European soil but is also directed on the whole towards achieving progress on the entire range of disarmament issues. This is why it has found support and understanding among the governments of most countries, including Sweden."

The leader of the Soviet delegation also set out the Soviet Union's point of view on the problem of establishing a nuclear-free zone in Europe's north, spoke of the stand of the Soviet side in the issue involving the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, and answered questions concerning the present state of Soviet-Swedish relations.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### IZVESTIYA ANSWERS READERS QUESTIONS ON ARMS ISSUES

PM161507 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Feature comprising readers' letters and replies by Aleksandr Bovin: "Readers Ask. IZVESTIYA's Political Observer Replies"]

[Excerpts] "I believe that U.S. military bases pose a great threat to the socialist camp. Why can't the Soviet Government have its own bases on the territory of other states to protect them and our interests against the U.S. military threat?" (F.I. Avtukhov, Apostolovo, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast)

The installation and use of military bases on the territory of other states is a rather costly and highly unpopular occupation in our time. Therefore: Should our military policy be perceived as a mirror image of U.S. military policy?

Here is the main criteria of the effectiveness of any major military measure: Does it strengthen international stability or not. I am afraid that the creation of new military bases does not pass the test of this criterion.

"I read in the 'Roundtable' feature a commentary on the NATO countries' response to the Warsaw Pact states' appeal. When will the newspaper at last understand that the party decision on publicity imposes the obligation to tell the people the whole truth? I would like to read the actual NATO proposals for myself, without any 'commentaries.'" (A.V. Denisov, Kharkov)

A daily newspaper's task is not just to report facts but also to comment on them. This is done everywhere. For example, I have no recollection at all of any Western newspapers ever publishing any Warsaw Pact documents in full, let alone "without commentaries." This is not a recommended example, of course. Just food for thought.... [passage omitted]

"Why is our country resuming nuclear tests? After all, our leadership has repeatedly declared that they are unnecessary for checking existing warheads, and we do not intend to create [sozdavat] any third generation nuclear weapons (of the SDI type)." (A.V. Novikov, Andropov)

Nuclear tests are needed in principle for various scientific research and military-experimental purposes (checking that the specifications of nuclear munitions match their tactical-technical tasks; confirming the estimated specifications of new types of nuclear charges; investigating the efficiency and effect of nuclear explosions on certain types of installations, equipment, and military technology).

The specific content of the test program is determined by the demands of the situation. Commenting on the first underground nuclear explosions following a prolonged break, a USSR Defense Ministry spokesman emphasized: As far as its nuclear test program is concerned, the Soviet Union will proceed exclusively on the basis of the minimum necessary for fundamental research national economic purposes, and checking the durability of equipment and weapons against the strike factors of nuclear explosions, including their durability against the means being developed under the U.S. SDI program plan.

"I believe that the USSR ought to bring its military doctrine into line with the new political thinking. There are so many weapons that the USSR can deter the United States with a considerably lower quantity of strategic weapons. Parity is not mandatory. A smaller proportion of weapons would demonstrate the absence of aggressive intentions in the Soviet Union. The arms race has its leader -- the United States. The USSR ought to take the position of leader in the disarmament race." (D.A. Dzyubanyuk, Kiev)

Theoretically, in a strictly abstract fashion, you are right. If we can guarantee a potential adversary's destruction "only" once, we would seem not to need any "multiple" capacity. But human logic does not exist outside psychological influences. A mathematically calculated, computerized universal catastrophe comes up against emotional objections and the insurmountable hope for survival.... These hopes urge "catching up" with the adversary and boosting the "destruction coefficient." [passage omitted]

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## RELATED ISSUES

### CPSU POLITBURO HOLDS SESSION, CONFIRMS MAY DAY SLOGANS

#### Prague, Shultz, Wright Visits

LD171944 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] At a routine session, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo has confirmed the slogans of the CPSU Central Committee for May Day, the day of international solidarity among working people.

The results of the official friendly visit to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, which took place from 9 to 11 April of this year, were examined.

It was noted that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's account at the meeting in Prague of the internationalist principles which the CPSU intends to be guided by in its relations with fraternal parties had met with a broad positive response. The conviction was expressed that on this basis new successes would be achieved in the development and the improvement of the socialist system of international relations and division of labor. It was emphasized that the new Soviet initiatives on issues of eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, and on other disarmament problems, open up the way to lessening the level of military confrontation on the continent, and that they fully meet the interests of all European countries.

The Politburo discussed the report by Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze about their talks with George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state. It was stressed that the question of whether it will be possible to find a solution in the very near future to major issues of disarmament, primarily on medium-range missiles and missiles of lesser range and of whether it will be possible to change for the better the situation in Soviet-American relations and in international affairs, will depend upon the conclusions that the U.S. Administration draws from what Shultz was told and what was proposed by the Soviet leadership during the talks.

The Soviet leadership is willing to solve these questions jointly in the same atmosphere of active dialogue and search for mutual understanding that distinguished the talks in Moscow with Shultz and the exchange of opinions between Comrades Gorbachev, Ligachev, Dobrynin and the delegation of the U.S. Congress, headed by the speaker of the House of Representatives, Wright.



## PRAVDA Lists Slogans

PM181527 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 87 First Edition p 1

["CPSU Central Committee Slogans for May Day 1987"]

[Excerpts] 27. Soviet servicemen! Reliably safeguard the peaceful, creative labor of our people and the gains of socialism!

28. Working people of the Soviet Union! The peace and security of the motherland are the concern of each of us! By dogged labor let us strengthen the cause of peace!

29. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the socialist countries! Long live world socialism--the mighty and influential force of the present time! May the community of socialist states grow stronger!

May the class solidarity of the Communists of all countries in the struggle for peace, social progress, and socialism grow stronger!

33. Peoples of all countries! Persistently advocate the improvement of the world situation and the creation of an all-embracing system of international security!

34. Peoples of the world! Demand the destruction of nuclear arsenals and of chemical weapons!

Let us not permit the militarization of space!

35. Peoples of Europe! Struggle for lasting peace and good-neighborly relations between states! Strive to secure the elimination of medium-range missiles on the continent and the radical reduction of conventional arms and armed forces!

36. Peoples of the Asian and Pacific countries! Pool your efforts for ensuring international security and peaceful cooperation in the region!

37. Long live the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union -- the policy of peace and security of the peoples and of broad international cooperation!

38. Long live our motherland -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!

39. Following the Leninist course of the 27th CPSU Congress, forward along the path of communist creation and peace!

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## RELATED ISSUES

### MOCSOW TV CLAIMS U.S. READYING FRG NEUTRON BOMB PLACEMENT

LD191936 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Apr 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov; with V. Kondratyev, identified by screen caption]

[Excerpts] [Kondratyev] On 6 August 1981, the day of memory of the victims of Hiroshima, the United States decided to produce neutron weapons.

According to information recently published in the FRG press, the number of these neutron weapons in the United States amounts to 600. [passage omitted]

Not without reason is it said that all secrets come out. In any case, the United States did not succeed in concealing from the public the composition of the cargo recently shipped by air transport to the Ramstein U.S. military airfield in the FRG. The cargo concerns weapons systems that on the threshold of the 1980's aroused a wave of general protest. Neutron death can be carried by artillery shells and also aircraft and missiles. Part of the stockpiles in the FRG, the United States contends, is outdated since these were produced as early as in the fifties. Archive films from that period show a salvo from a nuclear howitzer in the deserts of Nevada. But the Pentagon is not just striving for a replacement; it wants to create conditions for the rapid introduction of neutron weapons into the FRG. For this purpose it resorted to cunning. The ordinary nuclear charge W-79 is capable, with the aid of a special module, of being converted into a neutron charge. This operation, as you see, is not a complex one.

In reply to an inquiry by TV journalists, the FRG Ministry of Defense confirmed that W-79's had arrived in the country. Although both the West German Armed Forces and their U.S. colleagues refute the possibility of rearming these weapons, they are obviously not telling the truth. This is confirmed by U.S. Congress documents which state outright that the W-79 is designed for neutron devices, which for the moment are stored on U.S. territory. For political reasons neither the U.S. nor the West German government can afford to play their dangerous game out in the open. But the essential prerequisites are being created. In case of need, these modules can be transshipped to our continent in a few hours. They are asking what is the situation in the FRG, but are some of these not already stored somewhere already? After all, the United States is not in the habit of standing on ceremony with its partners; it does not ask their permission when the matter concerns its allies' military interests. [passage omitted]

We are faced with an indisputable fact. At the moment when a dialogue is underway between East and West on reducing and eliminating whole classes of nuclear weapons, the Pentagon is taking measures that go against the grain of the demands of our time. Is it not here that there lies concealed the solution to the stubborn reluctance of NATO to part with short-range missiles and battlefield weapons? In any case the proposals of the Soviet Union on this score have been received very coolly. [video shows clips from West German TV showing neutron bombs, U.S. bases in FRG, local press cuttings]

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## RELATED ISSUES

TASS: RETIRED GENERALS ARRIVE IN U.S. FOR CONFERENCE

### Soviet-American Conference

LD210943 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT 21 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 21 TASS -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

A delegation of Soviet retired generals and representatives of the Organizing Committee of the Soviet public organization Retired Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament as well as of the Soviet War Veterans Committee arrived in Washington on Monday. It will participate in a two-day Soviet-American conference on issues of preventing the danger of a nuclear disaster, disarmament and liquidation of nuclear arms. It was sponsored by the Center for Defence Information, an influential public organization of the USA.

At a press conference Gene Larocque, director of the Center for Defense Information, introduced to journalists members of the Soviet delegation led by Retired Lieutenant General Mikhail Milshteyn.

G. Larocque said that the conference was aimed at looking for ways of warding off a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The conference was unique. The admiral added that never in the history of mankind had generals and admirals gathered to try to prevent a war. Most of the participants, both on the American and Soviet side, fought during the Second World War. G. Larocque pointed out that all of them were quite sure that war was a foolish and senseless means of resolving difference and contradictions between countries.

"Our conference is unusual indeed," said M. Milshteyn. "For the first time in the history of Soviet-U.S. relations American and Soviet generals and admirals will deal with disarmament issues and will examine ways of lessening tension and removing the threat of a nuclear war. We are not an official delegation, and we are not representatives of the government. Our main aim is to try to improve relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and to strive for stronger mutual understanding between the two states."

The conference will discuss issues of maintaining parity of armed forces and armaments, correlation of armed forces in Europe, including nuclear ones, the situation in the sphere of strategic armaments and measures to defuse tension in the world.

# Generals Publish 'Declaration'

LD230404 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0220 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Washington, 23 Apr (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

When the Soviet-U.S. conference of retired generals on problems of disarmament and averting the danger of a nuclear catastrophe was drawing to a close on Wednesday, all its participants unanimously and unconditionally decided to prepare and publish a joint declaration on the outcome of the meeting in Washington.

This document stresses the need to suspend the work associated with the possibility of deploying weapons in space. It discusses the need to completely stop nuclear tests and strictly adhere to the Soviet-U.S. accords in the field of arms control.

Taking part in the work of the conference, which was initiated by the influential U.S. organization Center for Defense Information, was a delegation of the public group at the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace "Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament," headed by Lieutenant General Mikhail Milshteyn, retired.

"We have been discussing the most topical problems of concern at present not only for the peoples of the United States and the USSR, but for all peoples of the world," Lt Gen M. Milshteyn, retired, said in his talk to TASS correspondent. "They have been discussed by people who are professionally trained to correctly evaluate and detect potentially dangerous consequences of the processes that are taking place in the development of military technology, in military construction, and in military-strategic concepts."

"We have not had any divergence in opinions. The Soviet and U.S. generals and admirals have arrived at the joint conclusion that nuclear weapons should be eliminated and that this process should start as early as possible," Gene Larocque, director of the Center for Defense Information and retired admiral, said to the TASS correspondent. "We are at one in the opinion that it is necessary to cease nuclear tests. We all share the belief that the concept of 'Star Wars' is dangerous and that it should be immediately relinquished. The conference was not just a success. It has shown the USSR and the United States should and can resolve their problems through peaceful means and never unleash wars. We have had some insignificant disagreements, but they only applied to specific ways of striving for peace. We have not had any doubts about the chief objective: the need for disarmament and peace. The meeting was extremely successful and it showed that generals and admirals of the USSR and the United States were capable of assembling and reaching understanding at the negotiation table. This cannot fail to affect the public opinion in our countries."

"The most important thing is," retired Brigadier General James Terry stressed, "that we are all convinced that nuclear weapons should be eliminated. The Strategic Defense Initiative should also be relinquished. Putting new varieties of weapons in space cannot be tolerated."

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## RELATED ISSUES

### USSR: FURTHER ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM MONGOLIA

#### First Troops Return Home

LD131938 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Text] The first trainful of soldiers returning from Mongolia has arrived at the Naushki border station in the Soviet autonomous Republic of Buryatia. This is the beginning of an earlier announced pull-out of a motorized infantry division and several army units of the Soviet troops which are temporarily stationed in Mongolia. The withdrawal is being carried out in connection with a decision of the Soviet Government and its agreement with Mongolia's leadership.

#### Farewell Ceremony Held

LD161142 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0610 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 16 Apr (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Kim Boldokhonov reports:

A farewell ceremony for units of Soviet troops on their way home after their provisional stay in the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] was held today in Suhbaatar, a border town in northern Mongolia. Their departure is in accordance with the decision by the Soviet leadership and in agreement with the Government of the MPR.

A mass meeting was held in the town square. Officers and men of the Mongolian People's Army came to see off their brothers-in-arms. Also there were working people of the republic, war and labor veterans, members of the Revolutionary Youth League, and pioneers. In a solemn atmosphere, servicemen of the fraternal armies exchanged commemorative banners.

Tserendashiyn Namsray, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, chairman of the Central Council of the Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society, spoke at the meeting. We note with gratitude, he said, that the Soviet servicemen have fulfilled their international duty with honor. They have won the deep respect and love of the Mongolian people.

Moscow Mandarin Commentary

OW140726 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1500 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Mulatov commentary]

[Text] We have already reported that at the end of last week a motorized infantry division and several other units of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic began their pullout from that country back to the USSR. The Soviet leadership has made this decision on the basis of an accord with the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR].

In this regard, our station's observer Mulatov points out: It was last summer that Soviet leader Gorbachev announced in his speech at Vladivostok that the USSR and Mongolia had prepared themselves for the decision now being carried out. The accord to withdraw a large number of Soviet troops from Mongolia has been implemented accurately, following the prescribed order.

The Mongolian leaders and the people's representatives have expressed sincere appreciation on behalf of the Mongolian people to the Soviet officers and soldiers returning home for having fulfilled their own internationalist obligations. The mutual understanding and trust between the two fraternal socialist countries have brought about new development and new [word indistinct]. Above all, the Soviet Union and Mongolia have made effective contributions to creating an atmosphere of trust, good-neighbourliness, and cooperation in the Far East, not only in words alone, but also in deeds. This, in addition, fully concerns their mutual relationships with China.

Dear listeners, I would like to remind you of one thing in particular. In his Vladivostok speech, Comrade Gorbachev has advocated that the Soviets unite with the Chinese in making joint efforts to utilize the most abundant resources in the border Amur River basin. Now you have realized that this is not merely empty talk or dreaming. After that, in fact, the Soviet Union and China have held consultations on all kinds of issues concerning cooperation in border areas, have signed a series of specific agreement, have started the concrete work of the common plan for realizing economic cooperation in the Amur River basin, and have resumed border talks that will continue to be held in the future. Living up to one's word is regarded by the Soviet Union as a rule in its relationships with other countries.

U.S. Causing 'Dangerous Tension'

LD151222 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 14 Apr 87

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union has begun withdrawing part of its troops Mongolia temporarily deployed there. It's doing so by agreement with the Mongolian Government. Yurig Solton comments, and writes:

Let me remind you that the Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced a major troop withdrawal from Mongolia in his speech in Vladivostok last summer. He then suggested a comprehensive and specific program for strengthening security in Asia and the Pacific.

The Soviet Union has acted on its words. The current troop withdrawal from Mongolia is one example. But there are many other: The USSR has recalled six regiments from Afghanistan and coordinated a timetable for the withdrawal of the entire troop contingent from that country. The withdrawal will begin as soon as armed interference in Afghanistan's affairs is stopped and guarantees are given that it will not resume. The Soviet Union, alongside China, has signed protocols on respect for a treaty declaring the South Pacific as nuclear-free. It has said that it is prepared to discuss with China concrete steps to proportionately reduce the two countries' ground forces. The latest Soviet proposal, for the removal of Soviet and American medium-range missiles from Europe incorporates a major cut in such missiles in Asia.

In a word, the Soviet Union has not simply been speaking of the need to strengthen security in Asia and the Pacific but it has been doing a great deal to this end, giving an example to others. However, unilateral measures are unable to stop militarization and the growth of military threat in that part of the world. There has to be goodwill on the part of other nations, in the first place the United States. Regrettably there have been no signs that Washington would change its current policy aimed at greater military and nuclear presence in Asia and the Pacific. This is the main source of dangerous tension in the region.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### MOSCOW MANDARIN PRAISES PRC DISARMAMENT STANCE

OW271321 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Commentary by station observer Kuzmishchev]

[Text] Dear listeners: Confrontation of any kind is dangerous and arouses uneasiness because it may lead to the destruction of mankind. The movement to oppose the arms race and achieve disarmament and peace has gained worldwide momentum, and the struggle for disarmament has spread throughout the world. This movement has taken various forms. Stopping the arms race and achieving disarmament are important activities of the United Nations, the largest international organization. To promote the worldwide campaign to achieve disarmament, the United Nations has held regional conferences to discuss disarmament in various regions. Such a meeting will be held in Beijing for the Asian-Pacific countries. Station observer Kuzmishchev writes:

In my opinion, the decision to hold a UN disarmament conference in Beijing is very logical. China has made remarkable, positive changes in its foreign policy in recent years, showing that it is concerned about improving the international situation and is striving to promote disarmament, relax tension, and consolidate universal peace. Here is the evidence.

In 1986 China announced that it would stop atmospheric nuclear tests. This was supplementary to its earlier declaration that it would not be first to use nuclear weapons. On 10 February, after the Soviet Union, China joined the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. This aroused strong resentment from the Western nuclear powers -- the United States and France -- who subjected China to harassment.

China has criticized the U.S. Administration's infamous Strategic Defense Initiative, the chief obstacle to halting the arms race on earth and a means to expand the arms race to outer space. China has frequently expressed concern about the militaristic practices of the United States and its allies. For instance, not long ago, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit-87" exercise, which tremendously aggravates the situation on the Korean Peninsula, one of the hot spots in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing has paid more frequent attention to such dangerous trends as the growth of U.S. military spending. The Chinese press has correctly established a relationship between the increasingly reactionary nature of the Reagan administration's domestic policy and the new globalism in Washington's foreign policy. Encouraged by the United States, the Japanese ruling clique has openly followed a militaristic policy. In China this trend has not gone unnoticed.

Apparently China and the Soviet Union are concerned about the same thing. The two great socialist countries are worried about the fate of peace. China and the Soviet Union are concerned about creating an international situation that will provide the most favorable conditions for solving the problem of accelerating social and economic development and for consolidating socialism in their respective countries. Thus, the Soviet Union and China share identical or similar views on many of the most important problems. Mankind's future and existence depend to a considerable extent on the solution of these problems. This is quite natural. The bottom line is that both China and the Soviet Union belong to the socialist world.

We must also not forget that both China and the Soviet Union are big powers in Asia and the Pacific. The problems of the Asia-Pacific region are intimate and urgent ones for the Soviet Union and China, and fall within their sphere of interest. In my opinion, all this constitutes an objective reason for the Soviet Union and China to work together to consolidate peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and to peacefully cooperate with each other on an equal footing. Moscow and Beijing both realize that the destiny of the whole world is, to a great extent, determined by developments in this most populous part of the world.

All this is closely related to the question of disarmament. If these two largest socialist countries in the world could, for the sake of universal peace, solve these problems in a spirit of mutual cooperation, and meet each other's reasonable demands on the basis of common interests, they would benefit all the people in the Asia-Pacific region.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### PRC DELEGATE ADDRESSES UN BODY ON DISARMAMENT

OW220834 Beijing XINHUA in English 0533 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] United Nations, 20 April (XINHUA)--UN member states today began their fourth and final session at the preparatory committee in an effort to work out a document for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development.

Among the dozen speakers who addressed the two-week long session today, Yu Mengjia, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, said the draft of the primary document was the most important task of the committee. China submitted a working paper to "freshen up" the original 119-element document.

Stressing the necessity for the document to criticize the global arms race, he said it is equally important that the final document points out the special duties and obligations of the major military powers relating to disarmament and development.

The conference, scheduled in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987, is mandated to examine the implications of continued military expenditures for the world economy, particularly by nuclear and other major military powers, and to recommend remedial measures.

It will also consider ways of releasing additional resources through disarmament for development purposes, particularly in developing countries.

The decision to hold such a conference was adopted by the UN General Assembly at its regular session in 1984 on a proposal by French President Francois Mitterrand.

The conference was originally scheduled to be held in Paris in 1986. However, the French government asked for postponement until 1987.

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